Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
2019

How Courts in Criminal Cases Respond to Childhood Trauma
Deborah W. Denno

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Family Law Commons, and the Juvenile
Law Commons

DENNO_11FEB20 (DO NOT DELETE)

2/11/2020 1:25 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Volume 103

Winter 2019

Number 2

HOW COURTS IN CRIMINAL CASES
RESPOND TO CHILDHOOD TRAUMA
DEBORAH W. DENNO*
Neurobiological and epidemiological research suggests that abuse and
adverse events experienced as a child can increase an adult’s risk of brain
* Arthur A. McGivney Professor of Law, Founding Director, Neuroscience and Law Center,
Fordham University School of Law. All statistics and case distributions discussed in this Article and
presented in Charts 1–18 infra are organized and on file with the author and with the Marquette Law
Review. I delivered a version of this Article at Marquette University Law School as the George and
Margaret Barrock Lecture on Criminal Law, on November 15, 2018. I thank Dean Joseph Kearney,
Professor Michael O’Hear, and the friends and faculty of Marquette Law School for providing such an
encouraging and enthusiastic platform for the lecture, as well as Judge Mary Triggiano and Mike
Gousha for the “On the Issues” program concerning childhood trauma and the legal system. I am most
grateful to the following individuals for their contributions to this Article: Marianna Gebhardt, Joseph
Kearney, Michael O’Hear, Christopher Slobogin, Ryan Surujnath, Mary Triggiano, Erica ValenciaGraham, and the Board of Advisors of the Neuroscience and Law Center (Fordham Law School). Erica
Valencia-Graham expertly and painstakingly created all 18 charts. I also received insightful comments
on earlier versions of this Article from the participants in presentations given at Fordham Law School,
Stanford Law School (the BioLawLapalooza 3.0), Vanderbilt Law School (the Criminal Justice
Roundtable), and the New York City Bar Association. I give special thanks to an extraordinarily gifted
and dedicated group of assistants for their superb research: Kevin Aguirre, Stephanie Ali, William
Pickering Jones III, Ephraim Kaplan, Jacob Nadler, Jacob Neumark, Eitan Rudansky, and Ryan
Surujnath. In addition, I thank the staff of the Marquette Law Review, Andrew Salomone in particular,
for their impeccable care, skill, and organization throughout the editorial process. Alissa BlackDorward, Jacob Fishman, and the Fordham Law School library staff were wonderfully helpful, as
always. I am indebted to six sources for research funding: Fordham University School of Law,
Fordham’s Neuroscience and Law Center, Mr. and Mrs. John R. Costantino, the Gerald M. Edelman
Post-Graduate Fellowship in Neuroscience, Roger Sachs Family Foundation, and the Barnet and
Sharon Phillips Family Fund. No individual or organization acknowledged in this Article necessarily
supports the Article’s interpretations or conclusions. Responsibility for any mistakes or misjudgments
rests solely with the author. This Article is dedicated to the memory of William Pickering Jones III, a
brilliant and beloved member of the Fordham Law School community. Will, we miss you.

DENNO_11FEB20 (DO NOT DELETE)

302

2/11/2020 1:25 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[103:301

dysfunction associated with disorders related to criminality and violence.
Much of this research is predictive, based on psychological evaluations of
children; few studies have focused on whether or how criminal proceedings
against adult defendants consider indicators of childhood trauma. This Article
analyzes a subset of criminal cases pulled from an 800-case database created
as part of an original, large-scale, empirical research project known as the
Neuroscience Study. The 266 relevant cases are assessed to determine the
extent to which, and the methods whereby, criminal courts weigh and respond
to childhood trauma evidence. This Article first creates a systematic and
detailed definition of what constitutes childhood trauma evidence based on 20
factors, including physical and verbal abuse, dysfunctional upbringing, brain
damage or injury, and neglect and abandonment. These factors are then
examined in the context of the often life-long conditions caused by or related to
such trauma, ranging from mental illness and neurological disorders to poor
intellectual functioning and behavioral problems. A review of courts’
responses indicates that childhood trauma evidence is primarily used for
mitigation and can play a significant and persuasive role in claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, especially in death penalty cases. At the same time,
findings suggest that courts may offer attorneys a troubling degree of deference
by accepting their claims of “strategic” yet empirically unfounded decisions to
omit childhood trauma evidence in certain circumstances. This Article
provides real-world guidance for attorneys seeking to incorporate childhood
trauma evidence into their arguments, emphasizing the value of drawing a
distinct nexus between defendants’ childhood traumas and their adult criminal
behavior. Attorneys who understand the long-term effects of childhood trauma
will be better equipped to make such connections and effectively present this
evidence in court.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that defense
attorneys are constitutionally obligated in capital cases to rigorously investigate
“all reasonably available mitigating evidence” pertinent to a defendant’s history
and situation.1 Such individualized mitigation evidence, which is wide1. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (emphasis omitted) (quoting AM. BAR ASS’N,
ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY
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ranging, includes at its core indications of a defendant’s childhood trauma, in
all of its various forms.2 Yet there has been no systematic study of how courts
respond to childhood trauma evidence or how they incorporate it in their
decision making, despite some excellent analyses of key case law.3 This gap is
all the more significant given that offenders are far more likely to have a history
of childhood trauma than non-offenders, and that trauma has severe lifelong
consequences.4
This Article attempts to fill this gap. It examines childhood trauma
information from my “Neuroscience Study,” which provides data on every
criminal case in the United States that has addressed neuroscientific evidence
over the course of two decades.5 Neuroscience constitutes “the branch of the
CASES 11.4.1(C) (1989)); see also Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39 (2009) (quoting Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000)) (stating that “counsel had an ‘obligation to conduct a thorough
investigation of the defendant's background.’”).
2. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524; Porter, 558 U.S. at 39 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 396).
3. See Emad H. Atiq & Erin L. Miller, The Limits of Law in the Evaluation of Mitigating
Evidence, 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 167 (2018); Phyllis L. Crocker, Childhood Abuse and Adult Murder:
Implications for the Death Penalty, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1143 (1999); Bernice B. Donald & Erica Bakies,
A Glimpse Inside the Brain’s Black Box: Understanding the Role of Neuroscience in Criminal
Sentencing, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 481 (2016); Miriam S. Gohara, In Defense of the Injured: How
Trauma-Informed Criminal Defense Can Reform Sentencing, 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2018); Gene
Griffin & Sarah Sallen, Considering Child Trauma Issues in Juvenile Court Sentencing, 34 CHILD.
LEGAL RTS. J. 1 (2013); Michael Mello, “In the Years When Murder Wore the Mask of Law”: Diary
of a Capital Appeals Lawyer (1983–1986), 24 VT. L. REV. 583 (2000). In addition, some scholars
have studied incarcerated adults who experienced childhood trauma. Nancy Wolff & Jing Shi,
Childhood and Adult Trauma Experiences of Incarcerated Persons and Their Relationship to Adult
Behavioral Health Problems and Treatment, 9 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB. HEALTH 1908, 1909
(2012) [hereinafter Wolff & Shi, Childhood and Adult Trauma Experiences],
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3386595/pdf/ijerph-09-01908.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6D7Y-YT3G]; Nancy Wolff, Jing Shi, & Jane A. Siegel, Patterns of Victimization
Among Male and Female Inmates: Evidence of an Enduring Legacy, 24 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 469,
477
(2009)
[hereinafter
Wolff,
Shi,
&
Siegel,
Patterns
of
Victimization]
https://connect.springerpub.com/content/sgrvv/24/4/469.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/5E95-6TGW].
4. See Wolff & Shi, Childhood and Adult Trauma Experiences, supra note 3, at 1920–21.
5. For earlier analyses of the Neuroscience Study data, see Deborah W. Denno, The Myth of the
Double-Edged Sword: An Empirical Study of Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Cases, 56 B.C. L.
REV. 493 (2015) [hereinafter Denno, The Myth]; Deborah W. Denno, The Place for Neuroscience in
Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 69 (Dennis Patterson
& Michael Pardo eds., 2016); Deborah W. Denno, How Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys Differ in
Their Use of Neuroscience Evidence, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2016); Deborah W. Denno,
Concocting Criminal Intent, 105 GEO. L.J. 323 (2017); Deborah W. Denno, Neuroscience and the
Personalization of Criminal Law, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 359 (2019). Other wide-scale empirical research
on neuroscience has also been completed in Canada, England, the Netherlands, the United States, and
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life sciences that studies the brain and nervous system,”6 a topic of direct
relevance to childhood trauma because so many youths exposed to trauma face
brain and nervous system injuries. Childhood trauma is especially relevant to
the criminal justice system because of society’s entrenched recognition that
“defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged
background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than
defendants who have no such excuse.”7
Part II of this Article examines definitions and frameworks for delineating
childhood trauma as well as the impact of childhood trauma on an individual’s
later emotional, mental, and physical development, including criminal and
violent behavior. Part III describes the impact of childhood trauma in the
criminal justice system and also provides an overview of the Neuroscience
Study’s scope and goals. Additionally, Part III lays out the Neuroscience
Study’s definitional framework based on twenty categories of childhood
trauma. Lastly, Part III analyzes the conditions caused by or related to
childhood trauma, with a focus on criminal court cases. Part IV presents the
Neuroscience Study’s findings of courts’ responses to childhood trauma
evidence, emphasizing in particular the dominance of the use of such evidence
as mitigation (in nearly all of the cases) as well as its significance in claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, especially in capital cases. Moreover, Part IV
emphasizes the troublesome degree of deference that courts give to attorneys in
ineffective assistance of counsel cases, suggesting that some of the “strategic
decisions” that attorneys engage in, especially the omission of such evidence,
may not have an empirical foundation. Finally, Parts V and VI detail the wins
and losses of ineffective assistance of counsel cases and how attorneys can
effectively incorporate childhood trauma evidence into their arguments.
If increasing numbers of studies are showing links between childhood
trauma and later cognitive and behavioral problems among defendants, then
Wales. See Paul Catley & Lisa Claydon, The Use of Neuroscientific Evidence in the Courtroom by
Those Accused of Criminal Offenses in England and Wales, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 510 (2015) (England
and Wales); Jennifer A. Chandler, The Use of Neuroscientific Evidence in Canadian Criminal
Proceedings, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 550 (2015) (Canada); Nita A. Farahany, Neuroscience and
Behavioral Genetics in US Criminal Law: An Empirical Analysis, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 485 (2016)
(the United States); C.H. de Kogel & E.J.M.C. Westgeest, Neuroscientific and Behavioral Genetic
Information in Criminal Cases in the Netherlands, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 580 (2015) (the Netherlands).
6. NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 206 (Brent
Garland ed., 2004); see also OWEN D. JONES, JEFFREY D. SCHALL, & FRANCIS X. SHEN, LAW AND
NEUROSCIENCE 762 (2014) (defining neuroscience as “[t]he scientific study of the structure and
function of the nervous system; includes experimental and clinical studies of animals and humans”).
7. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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some courts’ causation limitations for omitting such information may no longer
be warranted. Likewise, if empirical research shows that juries and other
criminal justice actors view such evidence as predominately mitigating, then
attorneys’ purported “strategic decisions” to leave it out may, for the most part,
no longer be as justified. Indeed, the importance of childhood trauma evidence
is not just confined to capital cases. As this Article shows, the evidence is
applicable in a broad array of non-capital contexts, and attorneys are using it in
court for these purposes. Such ongoing applicability is all the more reason to
examine the breadth and pervasiveness of childhood trauma in the United States
and bring attention to it.
II. WHAT IS CHILDHOOD TRAUMA EVIDENCE?
There are numerous definitions of childhood trauma, often depending on
the source and purpose of the evidence. While these definitions are useful, of
course, they do not always translate smoothly into case law or the legal setting,
where childhood trauma may exist but never have been fully identified. This
Part provides an overview of some of the more known and accepted
descriptions of childhood trauma as a background for the factors that my
Neuroscience Study explicated.
A. Definitions and Frameworks
Some widely recognized health organizations define childhood trauma very
broadly. The National Institute of Mental Health, for example, characterizes
childhood trauma as “the emotionally painful or distressful experience of an
event by a child that may result in lasting mental and physical effects.”8 The
National Child Traumatic Stress Network states that “trauma occurs when a
child experiences an intense event that threatens or causes harm to his or her
emotional and physical well-being.”9 In contrast, the American Psychiatric
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5)
concerns one kind of trauma, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), which
mandates “[e]xposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual
violence.”10 DSM-5 lays out four symptoms of the clinical effects of trauma:
8. See Griffin & Sallen, supra note 3, at 6.
9. What Is Child Traumatic Stress?, NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK (2003),
https://www.nctsn.org/sites/default/files/resources//what_is_child_traumatic_stress.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7Q9R-M2DA].
10. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 271 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5].
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intrusions (such as nightmares or flashbacks of the trauma), avoidance (such as
activities, places, or individuals that may bring memories of the trauma),
negative cognitive alterations (such as exaggerated fears or feelings of
isolation), and altered arousal and awareness in reactions or perceptions (such
as irritability, aggression, or difficulties in sleeping and concentrating).11 An
individual must experience all four symptoms to satisfy DSM-5’s definition of
PTSD.12
There is also a commonly used standard that incorporates a number of
different definitions to help identify somewhat more contextually whether a
child is suffering from trauma.13 According to the Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration, a framework called “The Three E’s” can
pinpoint childhood trauma and trauma in general, based upon three
components: the Event, the Experience, and the Effects.14
The Event component is the “objective action” that is inflicted on a child.15
There can be many types of events, “includ[ing] abuse (physical, sexual,
emotional), neglect, violence (domestic and community), accidents, and acts of
terrorism.”16 Events can occur just once (such as a severe injury) or multiple
times (such as several, less severe injuries).17 Research shows that more than
60% of children encounter a traumatic event by age 16, and nearly one-third of
those children sustain multiple events.18
The second component, the Experience of the event, is more subjective, and
for unsurprising reasons. Children may experience events in emotionally
disparate ways,19 often depending on their demographics (age and maturity),
their particular situation, or vast numbers of other kinds of individual-specific

11. Id. at 271–72; Griffin & Sallen, supra note 3, at 8.
12. DSM-5, supra note 10, at 271–72; Griffin & Sallen, supra note 3, at 8.
13. See Griffin & Sallen, supra note 3, at 6.
14. See id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 6–7.
18. William E. Copeland, Lilly Shanahan, Jennifer Hinesley, Robin F. Chan, Karolina A. Aberg,
John A. Fairbank, Edwin J. C. G van den Oord, & E. Jane Costello, Association of Childhood Trauma
Exposure with Adult Psychiatric Disorders and Functional Outcomes, JAMA NETWORK OPEN, Nov.
9,
2018,
at
2
[hereinafter
JAMA
Study]
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2713038
[https://perma.cc/92KW5WSE].
19. See Griffin & Sallen, supra note 3, at 7.
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variables.20 For example, one child may suffer intense negative emotions at the
time the event occurs, while another may confront negative emotions at a later
time in life, once they more fully understand what happened.21 Regardless of
the timing, traumatic experiences “can overwhelm a person’s capacity to cope,
and elicit intense feelings such as fear, terror, helplessness, hopelessness, and
despair.”22
The third component is the Effect of the event and its impact on the child.23
While some effects, such as an acute emotional response, may occur shortly
after the event and often diminish after time, other effects may become more
apparent later and persist accordingly.24 Additional effects may be clinical in
nature and, therefore, fit the four DSM-5 symptoms of trauma.25
The link between early trauma and long-term negative consequences such
as intellectual, psychological, or neurological dysfunction has substantial
support in a vast array of research.26 Indeed, a prospective medical study of
20. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT
1
(2019),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubpdfs/long_term_consequences.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5NZX-KR39].
21. See Griffin & Sallen, supra note 3, at 7.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 8.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See David W. Brown, Robert F. Anda, Henning Tiemeier, Vincent J. Felitti, Valerie J.
Edwards, Janet B. Croft, & Wayne H. Giles, Adverse Childhood Experiences and the Risk of Premature
Mortality, 37 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 389 (2009); Clara Passmann Carr, Camilla Maria Severi
Martins, Ana Maria Stingel, Vera Braga Lemgruber, & Mario Francisco Juruena, The Role of Early
Life Stress in Adult Psychiatric Disorders: A Systematic Review According to Childhood Trauma
Subtypes, 201 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 1007 (2013); Vincent J. Felitti, Robert F. Anda, Dale
Nordenberg, David F. Williamson, Alison M. Spitz, Valerie Edwards, Mary P. Koss, & James S.
Marks, Relationship of Childhood Abuse and Household Dysfunction to Many of the Leading Causes
of Death in Adults: The Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) Study, 14 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED.
245 (1998); Jennifer Greif Green, Katie A. McLaughlin, Patricia A. Berglund, Michael J. Gruber,
Nancy A Sampson, Alan M. Zaslavsky, & Ronald C. Kessler, Childhood Adversities and Adult
Psychiatric Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication I: Associations with First Onset
of DSM-IV Disorders, 67 ARCHIVE GEN. PSYCHIATRY 113 (2010); Griffin & Sallen, supra note 3, at
6–13; Ronald C. Kessler, Katie A. McLaughlin, Jennifer Greif Green, Michael J. Gruber, Nancy A.
Sampson, Alan M. Zaslavsky, Sergio Aguilar-Gaxiola, Ali Obaid Alhamzawi, Jordi Alonso, Matthias
Angermeyer, Corina Benjet, Evelyn Bromet, Sonmath Chatterji, Giovanni di Girolamo, Koen
Demyttenaere, John Fayyad, Silvia Florescu, Gilad Gal, Oye Gureje, Josep Maria Haro, Chi-yi Hu,
Elie G. Karam, Norito Kawakami, Sing Lee, Jean-Piere Lépine, Johan Ormel, José Posada-Villa,
Rajesh Sagar, Adley Tsang, T. Bedirhan Üstün, Svetlozar Vassilev, Maria Carmen Viana, & David R.
Williams, Childhood Adversities and Adult Psychopathology in the WHO World Mental Health
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1,420 subjects published in the Journal of the American Medical Association
(the JAMA study) indicates that “childhood trauma casts a long and wideranging shadow,” heightening the risk for psychiatric disorders in adulthood,
poor health, addiction, behavioral problems, and criminality, as well as
financial, educational, and social impairments.27 In the JAMA study, these
kinds of risks held constant while controlling for “(1) childhood psychiatric
problems, (2) other family and individual hardships and adversities, and (3)
adult exposure to traumatic events.”28 As one psychologist noted, the study
“presents high-quality, unequivocal longitudinal data on a large sample,
attesting to the profound intertwining of these phenomena.”29 While the extent
of this intertwining can vary among individuals, of course, there are clear
patterns on how these various connections play out. For example, in the JAMA
study, “being exposed to trauma cannot only lead to psychopathology, but can
also foster socially deviant careers in the form of criminality and addiction,
thereby leading to more interpersonal and community violence, difficulty in
holding a badly paid job, and a problem-riddled social life.”30
Other research suggests that such trauma can impair brain development by
disrupting brain cell connections or by damaging the brain’s ability to respond
to crisis situations.31 This impairment can in turn heighten the likelihood that
an individual will experience an intense reaction to even low-key events and,
therefore, partake in continual “flight or fight behaviors.”32 Lastly, a growing
area of childhood trauma research is focusing on the transgenerational impact
of large-scale cultural traumas—fueled by evidence that negative social,

Surveys, 197 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 378 (2010); K. A. McLaughlin, K. J. Conron, K. C. Koenen, & S.
E. Gilman, Childhood Adversity, Adult Stressful Life Events, and Risk of Past-Year Psychiatric
Disorder: A Test of the Stress Sensitization Hypothesis in a Population-Based Sample of Adults, 40
PSYCHOL. MED. 1647 (2010); Kate M. Scott, Katie A. McLaughlin, Don A. R. Smith, & Pete M. Ellis,
Childhood Maltreatment and DSM-IV Adult Mental Disorders: Comparison of Prospective and
Retrospective Findings, 200 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 469 (2012).
27. JAMA Study, supra note 18, at 2, 7.
28. Id. at 7.
29. Marc Gelkopf, Social Injustice and the Cycle of Traumatic Childhood Experiences and
Multiple Problems in Adulthood, JAMA NETWORK OPEN, Nov. 9, 2018, at 1,
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2713032
[https://perma.cc/3ZDG7Y4N].
30. Id.
31. Griffin & Sallen, supra note 3, at 9.
32. Id. at 10.
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psychological, neurobiological, and perhaps even genetic effects can be passed
on through families in myriad ways that have yet to be fully understood.33
B. Links to Criminal Behavior
The vast array of research on childhood trauma, then, including the JAMA
Study, indicates links, either direct or indirect, between the effects of such
trauma and long-term psychiatric and behavioral difficulties, including
criminality. Consistent with the JAMA Study, earlier research has shown that
these difficulties can range from mood, behavioral, and substance abuse
disorders,34 to schizophrenia, psychosis, and psychotic-like behaviors as well
as bipolar disorder.35 Physical abuse, interpersonal trauma, and communitycreated trauma are also associated with later-life aggression.36 In turn,
aggression, depression, anxiety,37 and behavioral difficulties are often

33. See Brent Bezo & Stefania Maggi, Living in “Survival Mode:” Intergenerational
Transmission of Trauma from the Holodomor Genocide of 1932–1933 in Ukraine, 134 SOC. SCI. &
MED. 87 (2015); Yael Danieli, Fran H. Norris, Jutta Lindert, Vera Paisner, Brian Engdahl, & Julia
Richter, The Danieli Inventory of Multigenerational Legacies of Trauma, Part I: Survivors’
Posttrauma Adaptational Styles in Their Children’s Eyes, 68 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 167 (2015); Pierre
Fossion, Christophe Leys, Caroline Vandeleur, Chantal Kempenaers, Stéphanie Braun, Paul Verbanck,
& Paul Linkowski, Transgenerational Transmission of Trauma in Families of Holocaust Survivors:
The Consequences of Extreme Family Functioning on Resilience, Sense of Coherence, Anxiety and
Depression, 171 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 48 (2015); Yaakov Hoffman & Amit Shrira, Shadows of
the Past and Threats of the Future: ISIS Anxiety Among Grandchildren of Holocaust Survivors, 253 J.
PSYCHIATRY RES. 220 (2017); Mihaela Minulescu, Approaching Trans-Generational Trauma in
Analytical Psychotherapy, 217 PROCEDIA – SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. 1112 (2016); Nathaniel Vincent
Mohatt, Azure B. Thompson, Nghi D. Thai, & Jacob Kraemer Tebes, Historical Trauma as Public
Narrative: A Conceptual Review of How History Impacts Present-Day Health, 106 SOC. SCI. & MED.
128 (2014).
34. See Terrie E. Moffitt & The Klaus-Grawe 2012 Think Tank, Childhood Exposure to Violence
and Lifelong Health: Clinical Intervention Science and Stress-Biology Research Join Forces, 25 J.
DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 1619, 1625 (2013).
35. See Allison M. R. Lee, Igor I. Galynker, Irina Kopeykina, Hae-Joon Kim, & Tasnia Khatun,
Violence
in
Bipolar
Disorder,
PSYCHIATRIC
TIMES
(Dec.
16,
2014),
https://www.psychiatrictimes.com/bipolar-disorder/violence-bipolar-disorder
[https://perma.cc/TAB9-KLBX].
36. See Tania Josiane Bosqui, Ciarán Shannon, Bridget Tiernan, Nicola Beattie, John Ferguson,
& Ciaran Mulholland, Childhood Trauma and the Risk of Violence in Adulthood in a Population With
a Psychotic Illness, 54 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 121, 121 (2014).
37. See id; JAMA Study, supra note 18, at 5.
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predictors of criminal behavior and early encounters with the police.38 Most
significantly, childhood trauma victims are at a heightened risk of suffering
multiple mental health conditions,39 which can potentially enhance the
likelihood of aggression and recidivism.40 Overall, then, children who endure
trauma are more likely to engage in criminality and violent conduct.41
There have been some proposed explanations for why these links exist.
Neurobiological research suggests that early life stress events can disrupt the
normal development of brain systems, potentially leading to deficits in learning,
memory, and cognition.42 These associations perhaps explain why some studies
have found that some victims of childhood trauma display below-average IQs
as adults.43 Other studies have reported impairments in specific brain
systems44—for example, those systems that regulate an individual’s fear
response, impulse control, reasoning, planning, and academic learning.45
Presumably, more precise explanations are down the research road; regardless,
the connections between trauma and crime are substantial and compelling.
Additional research, which has focused on incarcerated populations, shows
that over half of male and female inmates have experienced some form of
childhood physical trauma before they turned eighteen (56% and 54% for males

38. See Laurie Ross & Samantha Arsenault, Problem Analysis in Community Violence
Assessment: Revealing Early Childhood Trauma as a Driver of Youth and Gang Violence, 62 INT’L J.
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 2726, 2734 (2018).
39. See Moffitt & Klaus-Grawe, supra note 34, at 1625.
40. See Merih Altintas & Mustafa Bilici, Evaluation of Childhood Trauma With Respect to
Criminal Behavior, Dissociative Experiences, Adverse Family Experiences and Psychiatric
Backgrounds Among Prison Inmates, 82 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 100, 100–01 (2018).
41. See id.
42. See Julian D. Ford, John F. Chapman, Josephine Hawke, & David Albert, Trauma Among
Youth in the Juvenile Justice System: Critical Issues and New Directions, NAT’L CTR. FOR MENTAL
HEALTH
&
JUV.
JUST.,
June
2007,
at
1–2,
https://www.ncmhjj.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/07/2007_Trauma-Among-Youth-in-the-Juvenile-Justice-System.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VPE3-G2MF].
43. See Moffitt & Klaus-Grawe, supra note 34, at 1625.
44. See Rasmus M. Birn, Barbara J. Roeber, & Seth D. Pollak, Early Childhood Stress Exposure,
Reward Pathways, and Adult Decision Making, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 13549, 13551
(2017).
45. See Ross & Arsenault, supra note 38, at 2736 (explaining that early childhood trauma victims
suffer detrimental effects on brain development in areas that regulate fear response, impulse control,
reasoning, planning, and academic learning).
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and females, respectively).46 Childhood sexual abuse is rarer, having been
reported by less than 10% of male inmates relative to 47% of female inmates.47
In turn, over 25% of incarcerated men were abandoned during childhood or
adolescence.48 The statistics go on, but the end of the story is that such types
of abuse are strong predictors of violence, criminality, and mental disorders in
adulthood as well as a sequelae of cognitive problems such as delayed memory,
emotional control, and negative responses to stress.49
In the legal setting, sophisticated attorneys will introduce childhood trauma
evidence if it is relevant to explain an array of disorders and behaviors that are
associated with their client’s criminality. Likewise, knowledgeable courts will
recognize these kinds of accumulative inter-linkages when they consider a
defendant’s background. In James v. Ryan,50 for example, the Ninth Circuit
stressed that “[i]t is well established that early childhood trauma, even if it is
not consciously remembered, may have ‘catastrophic and permanent effects on
those who . . . survive it.’”51 The court also noted how trauma can influence an
individual across their lifetime. Not only does trauma have “a severe impact
on the child’s mental development and maturation,” but also “[s]ustained
feelings of terror, panic, confusion, and abandonment as a child have long term
consequences for adult behavior.”52 Thus, for instance, “[p]sychosis,
dissociative states, depression, disturbed thinking, and alcohol and drug
dependency are directly linked to child victimization.”53 The next Part
considers these linkages in the context of an original, large-scale, empirical
research project on the associations between childhood trauma, neuroscience,
and the criminal justice system.

46. Wolff, Shi, & Siegel, Patterns of Victimization, supra note 3, at 477; Wolff & Shi, Childhood
and Adult Trauma Experiences, supra note 3, at 1909–10.
47. Wolff, Shi, & Siegel, Patterns of Victimization, supra note 3, at 477.
48. Wolff & Shi, Childhood and Adult Trauma Experiences, supra note 3, at 1909.
49. Id. at 1909–10; Donald & Bakies, supra note 3, at 482–86.
50. 679 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 2012).
51. Id. at 815 (emphasis added) (quoting Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100, 1132–33 (9th Cir.
2009)).
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Id.
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III. THE NEUROSCIENCE STUDY’S FRAMEWORK OF CHILDHOOD TRAUMA
EVIDENCE
Childhood trauma evidence is widely used in the criminal justice system in
a broad range of ways in both capital and non-capital cases. This Article’s focus
is primarily on capital cases because, in that realm, the evidence can be
particularly impactful as mitigation. At the same time, such evidence can be
amorphous, ill-defined, and overwhelming to legal actors, therefore creating
special challenges for attorneys in attempting to investigate it and properly
present it before a judge and jury.54
A. The Neuroscience Study’s Methodology
In 2012, I completed a study (the Neuroscience Study) that investigated
how courts assess the mitigating and aggravating strength of neuroscientific
evidence.55
I examined every criminal law case which addressed
neuroscientific evidence in any capacity over a two-decade period (between
1992—2012). These cases, which totaled to 800, produced a broad range of
variables relevant to the criminal justice system that were coded by trained law
school graduates.56 With respect to the Neuroscience Study’s operational
definition of the term “neuroscience,” that umbrella term included both imaging
tests (such as the MRI and PET scans) and non-imaging standardized tests (such
as the Wechsler test).57
While the 800 cases included a portion of cases that pertained to victims’
injuries, this Article focuses only on the 553 cases that concerned defendants’
conditions.58 Out of these 553 cases, 266 cases—or nearly half (48.10%)—
included evidence of childhood trauma.59 This composition is not surprising
given the strong connections between childhood trauma and a large array of
54. See Crocker, supra note 3, at 1146.
55. Denno, The Myth, supra note 5, at 493.
56. A discussion of the process for selecting and coding variables as well as the strengths and
weaknesses of the methodology is provided in detail elsewhere. Id. at 505.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 501. The Neuroscience Study’s 800 cases fall into three categories: 247 cases (30.88%)
concern neuroscientific evidence as it pertains to the victim, primarily to prove the extent of a victim’s
brain injury; 514 cases (64.25%) concern neuroscientific evidence as it pertains to the defendant; and
thirty-nine cases (4.88%) concern neuroscientific evidence as it pertains to both the defendant and the
victim because the brain capacity of one or more individuals in both the “victim” and “defendant”
categories were relevant. This Article’s major focus are these latter two categories—“defendant” and
“both victim and defendant”— totaling 553 cases.
59. See infra Chart 1.
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brain and behavioral disorders associated with criminality, especially violence.
Indeed, as I have reported previously, in the Neuroscience Study neuroscientific
evidence was presented more often by the defense for purposes of mitigation
than by the prosecution to show that a defendant should be imprisoned for a
long time or to receive the death penalty.60 The same differentiation is true of
childhood trauma evidence.61
The overall goal of my project on childhood trauma was threefold: to
analyze the various types of childhood trauma evidence that were introduced in
court,62 to show how this evidence was presented in terms of the conditions
caused by or related to childhood trauma,63 and to demonstrate how courts
responded to such evidence.64 The following sections start by describing the

60. See Denno, The Myth, supra note 5, at 544.
61. See infra Charts 2, 3, 4, & 11.
62. See infra Charts 2, 3, & 4. Types of Childhood Trauma, includes the following categories:
(a) physical abuse, (b) sexual abuse or molestation or rape, (c) verbal or emotional abuse, (d) neglect
or abandonment, (e) traumatic experience, (f) dysfunctional family life, (g) mental disorder/illness or
impairment developed during childhood, (h) neurological impairment or disorder developed during
childhood, (i) brain damage, (j) suffered head or brain injury during childhood, (k) prenatal issue or
issue at birth, (l) developmental issue, (m) physical illness or injury during childhood, (n) poverty or
financial trouble, (o) disadvantaged in some way, (p) suicide attempt before age 18, (q) been arrested
and/or in juvenile detention, (r) exposed to violence or bad influence outside of home, (s) exposure to
toxic substance, (t) substance abuse during childhood, (u) childhood only described as “difficult” or
“poor.”
63. See infra Chart 6. Conditions that were Caused by or Related to Childhood Trauma,
includes the following categories: (a) neurological impairment or disorder, (b) mental illness or
psychiatric symptoms, (c) poor intellectual functioning, (d) physical handicap, (e) mental retardation,
(f) emotional issues, (g) problems in school, (h) limited or lack of education, (i) PTSD, (j) low-IQ, (k)
ADD or ADHD, (l) learning disability (or “slow learning”/special education), (m) behavioral
problems.
64. See infra Charts 11 & 15. Purpose of Evidence of Childhood Trauma and Courts’
Responses, includes the following categories: (a) defendant presented (or argued should have been
presented) evidence as mitigating evidence, (b) evidence related to insanity defense, (c) evidence
related to diminished capacity defense or claim, (d) evidence related to claim of incompetence, (e)
evidence related to defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, (f) evidence related to
claim of mental retardation, (g) evidence related to claim of guilty but mentally ill, (h) evidence related
to sufficiency of the evidence claim, (i) defendant sought funds for additional childhood trauma
investigation, (j) claim of prosecutorial misconduct in regard to evidence, (k) issue of malingering
related to childhood trauma evidence, (l) some or all of childhood trauma evidence rejected by court,
(m) some or all of childhood trauma evidence rejected by court, (n) defendant argued there was error
in court’s treatment of evidence, (o) IAOC claim regarding childhood trauma evidence, (p) IAOC claim
successful, (q) IAOC claim unsuccessful, (r) IAOC claim not ruled on, (s) defendant argued against
the presentation of childhood trauma evidence.
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defendants’ crimes and sentences to provide context for how defense attorneys
used childhood trauma evidence.
B. Crimes and Sentences
Nearly all (98%) of the Neuroscience Study’s 266 childhood trauma cases
involved defendants who were convicted of murder, as Chart 1 of this Article
indicates. Similarly, most (93%) of those cases began as a capital case even if
that death sentence was reduced to a non-capital case. Only 7% of defendants
received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole or a less serious
level of incarceration.
CHART 1
Crimes and Sentences
266 Total Cases
Non-Death Penalty Cases

19

Death Penalty Cases

247

Non-Homicide Cases

6

Homicide Cases

260
0

100

200

300

Number of Cases
Overall, then, childhood trauma evidence is typically introduced in cases
where defendants face the death penalty, a life sentence, or a decades-long
prison sentence. While most of the Neuroscience Study’s 800 cases were
comparably serious,65 the cases involving childhood trauma were even more so,
representing some of the most violent crimes that the project examined. Given
the recognized linkages between childhood trauma and brain development, the
Neuroscience Study offers an unprecedented opportunity to consider how
65. Denno, The Myth, supra note 5, at 501–02.
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childhood trauma evidence fits into the framework of the legal system from
multiple and diverse perspectives.
C. The Neuroscience Study’s Definitional Framework
Most experts and organizations define or depict childhood trauma very
broadly,66 including the different facets that may fall under a more structured
framework such as “The Three E’s”—the traumatic Event, the child’s
Experience, and the Effects to that child that may follow.67 Yet, a thorough
discussion of how childhood trauma plays out in the courtroom requires a
definition more relevant to how criminal cases present the evidence, as opposed
to a detailed but medically-oriented account, such as that presented in the
JAMA Study.68 In addition, a legally-oriented definition enables researchers to
better identify different types of trauma and measure its impact in the legal
system.
In the Neuroscience Study, in order to be included as childhood trauma, the
evidence identified had to be discussed in the context of the defendant’s
background, family history, or childhood, and it needed to have occurred before
the defendant turned eighteen years old. Using the childhood trauma literature
as a guide, especially the JAMA Study, this Article identified twenty different
types of childhood trauma and categorized them generically in three different
ways, as Charts 2–4 illustrate: Family Trauma, Developmental Trauma, and
External Trauma.
The twenty categories of childhood trauma in Charts 2–4 range from the
most common types of trauma (dysfunctional family life,69 physical abuse,70

66. See supra Section II.A (providing major definitions of childhood trauma).
67. See Griffin & Sallen, supra note 3, at 6.
68. See supra notes 27–30 (discussing the JAMA Study).
69. A dysfunctional family life could include anything from an abusive parent to neglect to
general turmoil in the household. See, e.g., People v. Ray, 914 P.2d 846, 855 (Cal. 1996) (stating that
the defendant’s parents fought violently and drank heavily, and the defendant’s mother worked as a
prostitute).
70. Physical abuse was often inflicted by a parent, foster parent, or other adult member of the
defendant’s family. See, e.g., People v. Beeler, 891 P.2d 153, 162 (Cal. 1995) (stating that the
defendant was subjected to extreme physical abuse at the hands of his stepmother throughout his
childhood).
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neglect,71 brain damage,72 substance abuse,73 head injury,74 traumatic
experience75), to the least common (verbal abuse,76 disadvantaged in some
way,77 physical illness,78 exposure to violence,79 suicide attempt,80 and exposure
to a toxic substance81). The additional factors include mental illness,82

71. Neglect refers to any neglect or abandonment a defendant suffered at the hands of a parental
figure.
72. Brain damage refers only to brain damage that was organically caused either by a prenatal
injury or developmental issue. Brain damage caused by a head injury due to a parent’s beating of the
child, for example, is not included in this category. For example, in Bean v. Calderon, one expert, Dr.
Blunt, testified that, “after performing five neurological tests, she was convinced that Bean was
organically brain damaged from three lesions on the brain.” 163 F.3d 1073, 1088 (9th Cir. 1998).
73. Substance abuse includes abuse of any type of drug, illegal or prescription, and alcohol.
74. Head injury refers to defendants who suffered a non-organic brain injury that lead to some
form of brain damage or abnormality. For example, in Correll v. Ryan, the defendant incurred a brain
injury at age seven when a brick wall fell on him, 539 F.3d 938, 952 (9th Cir. 2008), and “was
diagnosed with a subgaleal hematoma, which is a bruise or collection of blood under the scalp, but
above the skull.” Id. at 961–62 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).
75. Traumatic experiences can include the death of a loved one, exposure to violence, abuse, and
more. For example, the court in Middlebrooks v. Bell described the defendant’s history of sexual
torture, forced prostitution, and early exposure to drugs as “traumatic childhood experiences.” 619
F.3d 526, 537 (6th Cir. 2010).
76. Verbal abuse includes forms of communication that can constitute psychological abuse and
emotional abuse.
77. Disadvantaged in some way is intentionally broad and served as a catch-all for cases that may
not have fit into some of the other categories listed or as an additional category for those cases that did.
For example, in Stankewitz v. Wong, the defendant had a disadvantaged upbringing due to the fact that
his parents were unable to care for him and he spent his childhood being shuffled from one foster home
or mental institution to another. 659 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1108 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
78. Physical illness includes any bodily illness that did not involve a mental illness or brain
damage. See, e.g., Bible v. Ryan, 571 F.3d 860, 866 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that, as a child, the
defendant suffered from continuous illnesses such as allergies, fevers, and upper respiratory
infections).
79. Exposure to violence includes exposure to any violence or serious negative influence that
occurred outside of the home, including gang or cultural violence.
80. Any suicide attempt that occurred prior to the defendant turning age 18 was included in this
category.
81. The toxic substances referred to in this category do not include commonly used drugs or
alcohol. Rather, such toxic substances include pesticides, carbon monoxide, pollution, lead, asbestos,
and more. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345, 420 (Pa. 2011) (stating that from an early
age, the petitioner started huffing over-the-counter toxic substances and eating paint chips).
82. Mental illness includes mental illness and mental disorders (such as schizophrenia,
personality disorders, depression, and more) as well as mental impairment (any form of cognitive
dysfunction or cognitive disability—what some courts still call by the outmoded term, “mental
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poverty,83 developmental issue,84 neurological disorder,85 sexual abuse,86
prenatal issue,87 and juvenile detention.88 Substantial numbers of defendants
experienced some kind of head or brain injury or mental disorder and illness
during childhood, if not brain damage specifically (Chart 3). In addition, there
was a considerable amount of trauma and neglect in the family that was
measured in a range of different ways (such as poverty, neglect, or child abuse).
While the categories in Charts 2–4 are broken down in an effort to offer greater
precision, it is clear overall that this is a highly traumatized group.

retardation”). For example, in People v. Smith, the defendant’s IQ was around 85, and he was
diagnosed as being moderately “mentally retarded.” 107 P.3d 229, 234 (Cal. 2005).
83. Poverty is defined as financial difficulty, lack of food and necessities, or poor environment
and living situation.
84. Developmental issues are defined as any problem that hindered or negatively affected the
mental, intellectual, or emotional development of a defendant.
85. Neurological disorder includes circumstances when the defendant suffered from a
neurological disorder or illness. See, e.g., People v. Thornton, 161 P.3d 3, 18 (Cal. 2007) (stating that
one doctor examined the defendant and “identified significant pediatric neurological difficulties, eating
and walking problems, a low intelligence quotient.”).
86. Sexual abuse is a broad category that also includes rape and molestation.
87. Prenatal issues include complications during pregnancy or birth, a birth defect or illness, Fetal
Alcohol Syndrome, and more. For example, in Pike v. State, the defendant’s mother testified that the
defendant was born prematurely via Caesarean and “with a condition known as hyaline membrane
disease where the lungs are not fully developed and had bilateral hip dysplasias, which occurs when
the hip sockets are not fully formed.” No. E2009-00016-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 1544207, at *10
(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2011).
88. Juvenile detention includes when the defendant had been arrested during their childhood
and/or spent time in juvenile detention.
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CHART 2
Types of Childhood Trauma: Family Trauma
266 Total Cases
Verbal or Emotional Abuse
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Sexual Abuse, Molestation or Rape

53

Poverty or Financial Trouble

64

Traumatic Experience
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Neglect and/or Abandonment
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CHART 3
Types of Childhood Trauma: External Trauma
266 Total Cases
Exposure to Toxic Substance
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Suicide Attempt
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Exposed to Violence Outside of…
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CHART 4
Types of Childhood Trauma: Developmental Trauma
266 Total Cases
Physical Illness or Injury

29

Prenatal Issue or Issue at Birth

52

Neurological Impairment or…
Developmental Issue
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Mental Disorder/Illness or…
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Head or Brain Injury
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Brain Damage
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Most defendants in the Neuroscience Study experienced multiple types of
abuse, as Chart 5 shows. The greatest cluster of cases involved defendants who
have suffered between three-to-seven different types of trauma. But 13% of
defendants experienced ten or more types of trauma and nearly half (123 cases
or 46%) experienced five or more types. In People v. Beeler,89 for example,
Rodney Beeler, who was convicted of first-degree murder and armed burglary
and sentenced to death,90 introduced during the penalty phase numerous family
members and medical experts who testified that for some years Beeler’s
stepmother subjected him “to extreme psychological, physical, verbal, and
sexual abuse.”91 Not only would she beat him with various objects and throw
him down the stairs with his hands tied,92 she would also chain him to a
basement post for days, “forc[ing] him to urinate and defecate in his underpants,

89.
90.
91.
92.

891 P.2d 153 (Cal. 1995).
Id. at 153.
Id. at 162.
Id.
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and then beat[ing] him for that as well.”93 In addition she would smear his feces
on his face and hold his hands over flames.94 “She once pulled his thumbs from
their sockets. She forced him to eat fruit preserves until he vomited.”95
CHART 5
Number of Types of Childhood Trauma Suffered by
Defendants
266 Total Cases
18
One Type of Trauma
21
Two Types of Trauma
31

Three Types of Trauma

34

Four Types of Trauma
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Beeler’s stepmother also subjected him to extreme sexual abuse, forcing
him to dress in female clothing (which he did not want to wear) and tying his
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 162–63.
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penis down so that he could not see it “and telling him he looked better that
way.”96 A psychologist testified in detail concerning other kinds of extreme
sexual abuse,97 stressing that, due to the experiences of his childhood, Beeler
“suffered a variety of mental maladies, including schizophrenia and
disassociation, which in general might best be described as comparable to but
more severe than posttraumatic stress syndrome.”98 Beeler argued that his
death sentence was “inappropriate and ‘shock[ed] the conscience’ in light of
his horrible childhood, his brain damage, his efforts to provide for his family,
and the fact that his most recent prior conviction was [nearly a decade] old.”99
Yet, the Court remained unpersuaded, emphasizing the appropriateness of the
death penalty for Beeler’s “innocent victim” and questioning whether Beeler
actually suffered from organic brain damage.100 Regardless, by concluding that
“evidence of brain damage would not necessarily render the death penalty cruel
or unusual,”101 the court left open the possibility that it certainly could. In sum,
Beeler might have avoided the death penalty had the court fully accepted his
brain damage evidence.
As the next Sections show, evidence of brain damage may not be sufficient,
but it does enable courts to better perceive childhood trauma as mitigating if
they accept its validity. The discussion focuses on how childhood trauma
connects to an individual’s later adolescent and adult development.

96. Id. at 163.
97. Id. According to the expert, Beeler’s stepmother gave him
enemas, using Vaseline and taking a tampon, at first just a clean tampon, and then
she would use her own soiled, bloody tampons and insert them in his anus. . . . In
addition, she would make him insert tampons in her vagina so she was having
him touch her as well, and she would make him fondle her vagina area and have
him lick her vagina area so she could reach a climax. . . . She would also
masturbate him at that age—as he got older, some of it is progressing as he got
older—between the two-year period of time of 10 and 12, but not allow him to
reach an orgasm. When he was a little older and he would reach an orgasm, she
would take the semen and smear it all over his face and he would be punished for
that. In addition, in order to prevent him from reaching a climax, she would
squeeze his testicles, and he remembers that being done with great pain to him.
Later on, she would have intercourse with him and insert his penis in her vagina
but not allow him to reach an orgasm.
Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 178.
100. Id.
101. Id.
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D. Conditions Caused by or Related to Childhood Trauma
Another step in determining courts’ responses to childhood trauma cases is
to identify the various conditions that were either caused by or related to the
childhood trauma evidence that was introduced into court, as Chart 6 indicates.
There is some overlap between the types of childhood trauma listed in Charts
2–4 and the conditions listed in Chart 6, in part because it can be difficult to
determine whether a defendant’s issue was being presented as evidence of
childhood trauma or as a condition that was caused by childhood trauma. For
example, in Chart 6, the categories of Mental Illness and Neurological Disorder
were also included in Chart 3. Generally, for a mental illness or neurological
disorder to have been included in the “Types of Childhood Trauma” list (Charts
2–4), the illness or disorder must have been developed during childhood. In
order to be included in the “Conditions Caused by or Related to Childhood
Trauma” list (Chart 6), however, the illness or disorder may have developed
during childhood or later in life, and it must be described in the court’s opinion
as something that was directly caused by childhood trauma.
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CHART 6
Conditions Caused by or Related to Childhood Trauma
266 Total Cases
Physical Handicap
PTSD
Mental Retardation

5
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Problems with School or Education
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As Chart 6 shows, most conditions caused by or related to childhood trauma
pertain to some kind of mental illness or psychiatric symptoms or problems in
school, followed by neurological impairment or disorder, low IQ, or learning
disability. The least frequent conditions relate to a limited education, PTSD, or
a physical handicap.
Pike v. State102 exemplifies a defendant who experienced several different
types of childhood trauma including verbal, emotional, and physical abuse, a
dysfunctional family life, and other traumatic experiences that resulted in
severe behavioral issues and neurological problems. Her claim, however, was
102. No. E2009-00016-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 1544207, *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2011).
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that her attorney did not sufficiently investigate evidence of her mental illness
and psychiatric symptoms—specifically brain damage and bipolar disorder.103
Christa Gail Pike was found guilty of first degree murder and conspiracy to
commit first degree murder and was sentenced to death.104 During the
sentencing phase, the defense called Pike’s aunt, Carrie Ross, to testify in
mitigation.105 According to Ross, Pike lacked “maternal bonding” because she
was premature and raised by her paternal grandmother.106 Pike’s own family
had a history of substance abuse and a maternal grandmother who was alcoholic
and verbally abusive.107 When Pike’s paternal grandmother died, Pike “was
shuffled between her mother and father,” experiencing “very dirty” living
conditions and few rules,108 conditions that led her to attempt to commit suicide
after her grandmother’s death and engage in problematic behavior.109 Starting
at age nine, Pike was growing marijuana in her home and, at age fourteen, was
allowed to have a live-in boyfriend who had been arrested for physically
abusing her.110 Pike also evidenced mental challenges during early childhood
and overdosed on Tylenol in the third grade.111 Additional testimony indicated
sexual abuse: Pike’s mother reported that Pike had been raped at school and
later sexually molested when she was sixteen years old.112
According to Pike, her trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to
sufficiently investigate evidence that she suffered from brain damage and
bipolar disorder and also failed to bring forward an array of lay witnesses who
could have bolstered her defense.113 Pike based her claims on the testimony of
two experts who documented her problems—a history of seizures since infancy,
an abnormal EEG when she was fourteen months, and a traumatic head injury
at age fourteen as well as her mother’s alcoholism while she was pregnant with
Pike.114 As Pike stated, “despite all this evidence which suggested brain

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at *52.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id. at *11.
Id.
Id. at *52.
Id.
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damage, the defense team conducted no neurological investigation” and, “[a]s
such, counsel failed to discover [Pike’s] neurological disabilities, namely, an
abnormality in the brain that impairs her impulse control.”115 Pike also argued
that her psychological evaluation conducted by one of her experts was
insufficient and that her trial diagnosis of borderline personality disorder was
incorrect.116
The appellate court rejected Pike’s claim, however, determining that the
ineffective assistance of counsel issue was properly denied because counsel
need not know more psychology or neurology than the experts he hired.117
“Lead counsel was asked at the post-conviction hearing if any of the retained
experts had recommended additional testing, and he answered in the
negative . . . [and that] if such recommendation had been made, he would have
pursued it.”118
In essence, then, in the court’s eyes, Pike’s counsel did what he was
supposed to do, and the court’s denial of ineffectiveness was viewed as
understandable. At the same time, a different court could have provided an
alternative viewpoint. The issue should not have been whether counsel knew
“more psychology or neurology than the experts he hired,” but rather whether
he knew more law than his experts—specifically, the bounds of what would be
considered acceptable indications of a “strategic decision” for admitting
evidence. Experts need information and guidance from the attorneys who hire
them—they do not operate in a vacuum. Attorneys must be sufficiently versed
in other kinds of disciplines to make sound requests and offer knowledgeable
arguments, especially in the wide-ranging area of childhood trauma.
E. Tests for Measuring Childhood Trauma
Cases in the Neuroscience Study relied on a range of different tests to
confirm the diagnoses of brain damage and mental illness that comprise
components of the definition of childhood trauma in Charts 2–4 as well as the
conditions caused by or related to childhood trauma in Chart 6. These tests
included imaging and non-imaging techniques, both of which are used in cases,
and to beneficial effect, since they can measure different types of damage.119

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id. at *53.
Id. at *54.
Id.
Denno, The Myth, supra note 5, at 505.
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CHART 7
Neuroimaging Testing
266 Total Cases
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These techniques are also reflected in the subsample of 266 childhood
trauma cases, as Charts 8 and 9 demonstrate. The techniques are not mutually
exclusive, and a number of different types of tests can be applied to evaluate
one defendant. As Chart 7 shows, at least one type of brain imaging test was
used in nearly half of the cases (129 cases or 48.50%), although, on the whole,
most major tests were represented: the CT scan, PET scan, MRI, and EEG.
Likewise, as Chart 9 shows, some cases involved a substantially broader range
of non-neuroimaging tests. Such expansiveness is not surprising since
neuroimaging tests are a relatively recent phenomenon and non-imaging tests
measure additional facets of brain activity as well as an array of disorders,
ranging from low IQ, to tests for impaired fine and gross motor skills, to clinical
tests for psychiatric disorders and so on.
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CHART 9
Types of Non-Neuroimaging Tests
266 Total Cases
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Overall, then, the Neuroscience Study shows that courts admit many
different types of neuroscientific evidence in cases involving childhood trauma.
In addition, attorneys representing either the prosecution or the defense must
learn about medical and psychiatric conditions and the cutting-edge techniques
that experts use to measure them. Chart 10 indicates that, unsurprisingly, there
is a wide variety of experts who testify and provide evidence in childhood
trauma cases. The witnesses are dominated by mental health experts—
psychologists and psychiatrists—yet, many of the other kinds of experts who
are listed could cover mental health issues as well, including physicians and
pediatricians. These latter two categories are overlapping, of course. While the
Neuroscience Study errs on the side of presenting as much detail as possible
and abides by the designation provided by courts so as to not read in broader
(and possibly erroneous) interpretations, readers can combine Chart 10’s
categories to get a sense of the extent to which mental health experts control
these cases.
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CHART 10
Types of Expert Witnesses
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Charts 11 and 12 indicate why there are advantages to retaining specific
types of experts to assist in the defense’s case. As would be expected, Chart 11
shows that mitigation evidence is the most widely used category in which
attorneys relied on experts in court. At the same time, Charts 11 and 12 together
demonstrate that neuroscientific evidence is incorporated for numerous types
of arguments and purposes. Some of these purposes are strategic; for example,
to support or rebut a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or to support or
rebut the use of a brain scan (Chart 11). But the breadth of a claim of childhood
trauma covers many different kinds of injuries and disorders, as Chart 12 lays
out—spanning from broad categories, such as a history of childhood abuse or
trauma and mental illness or disorder, to far more specific categories, such as
fetal alcohol syndrome or a suicide attempt.
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CHART 11
The Purpose of Expert Testimony
266 Total Cases
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CHART 12
Expert Witness Findings
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Charts 11 and 12 also reveal that the evidence is presented by both sides—
the defense’s efforts to indicate a disorder or claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel and the prosecution’s efforts to rebut such arguments entirely. The use
of experts and the different types of abnormalities about which they testify will
become further apparent in the following accounts of the cases and arguments
that attorneys make when presenting such evidence in court.
IV. PRESENTATION OF CHILDHOOD TRAUMA EVIDENCE AND COURTS’
RESPONSES
Attorneys incorporate childhood trauma evidence in a broad range of ways
in criminal proceedings, which correspond with the many types of conditions
that children suffer. In criminal cases, childhood trauma evidence is often used
for death penalty mitigation in an effort by defendants to attempt to reduce a
potential death sentence to a lesser sentence.120 Death penalty defendants have
a constitutional right to present mitigating evidence, and the jury may not refuse
to consider mitigating evidence during their deliberations.121
A. How Attorneys Use Childhood Trauma as Mitigation Evidence
Most cases evaluating childhood trauma evidence for purposes of
mitigation relied on many of the factors listed in Charts 2–4; therefore, part of
the courtroom battle over evidentiary or mitigation issues in individual cases
would apply to some factors more than others. In United States v. Hammer,122
for example, the jury was presented with several possible mitigating factors to
consider, including the following five: (1) “Mr. Hammer suffers from cognitive
deficits;” (2) “Mr. Hammer is the product of a violent, abusive and chaotic
childhood;” (3) “As a child, Mr. Hammer was a victim of sexual abuse;” (4)
“As a young person, Mr. Hammer attempted to seek help for mental
difficulties;” and (5) “Mr. Hammer presently suffers from a major mental
disease or defect.”123
All twelve jurors found by a preponderance of the evidence that mitigating
factors (2) and (4) existed, and six found that mitigating factor (3) existed.124
Eleven jurors concluded that Hammer failed to prove mitigating factor (1), and
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See Crocker, supra note 3, at 1156.
Id. at 1150.
404 F. Supp. 2d 676 (M.D. Pa. 2005).
Id. at 685.
Id. at 686.
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all twelve jurors concluded that Hammer failed to prove mitigating factor (5).125
The jury determined, however, that the aggravating factors outweighed the
mitigating factors and recommended a death sentence for Hammer for the first
degree murder of his cellmate while he was incarcerated.126
Hammer appealed, making several claims, including a claim of erroneous
findings relating to mitigating circumstances.127 For example, during closing
arguments, the prosecution asserted that “Mr. Hammer has no cognitive
disorders”; yet there was no evidence presented that rebutted the expert’s
testimony stating that Hammer demonstrated “cognitive disorders or
deficits.”128 In addition, although the prosecution never rebutted evidence
presented at the trial showing that Hammer was sexually abused as a child, six
jurors determined that Hammer failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that he was a child abuse victim.129
In this appeal, the court engaged in very detailed findings of fact which
included an extensive look at the evidence of childhood trauma that was
presented at trial. One defense expert testified, for example, that “Hammer’s
family history includes a history of alcoholism, depression, prescription drug
abuse, seizures and Attention Deficit Disorder. Instability was also a family
trademark throughout Mr. Hammer’s childhood evidenced in part by the fact
that he attended many different schools before dropping out at the tenth
grade.”130 Hammer told the expert of several instances of abuse, including
times when his mother used to give him enemas with hot sauce, genitally molest
him, and inflict extreme physical and emotional abuse.131 The expert diagnosed
Hammer with PTSD with dissociative symptoms and Borderline Personality
Disorder.132 Another expert also testified for the defense and determined that,
based on MRI results, the abnormally small size of Hammer’s brain was the
result of dystrophy, “consistent with organic causes such as pre-natal maternal
alcohol use and failure to thrive, as well as external causes, such as abuse and
neglect.”133
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 685–86.
Id. at 680, 686.
Id. at 790–91.
Id.
Id. at 791.
Id. at 716.
Id. at 716–17.
Id. at 718.
Id. at 723.
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With regard to Hammer’s erroneous findings related to mitigating
circumstances, the court determined that, “many of the jury’s findings relating
to mitigating circumstances . . . are erroneous, including the finding of 12
jurors that at the time of trial Mr. Hammer did not suffer from a major mental
disease or defect, the finding of 11 jurors that he did not suffer from cognitive
deficits, and the finding of 6 jurors that as a child he was not the victim of sexual
abuse.”134 Based on this determination, the court concluded that Hammer was
justified in receiving a new penalty-phase trial.135
In Hammer, it appears significant that the primary appellate court battle
concerned a range of childhood trauma evidence including, most particularly,
brain trauma evidence. The next Section on ineffective assistance of counsel
accentuates the importance of this multiplicity of approaches in terms of the
numbers of factors and conditions that are examined.
B. Standards for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Central to the arguments presented in the Neuroscience Study’s 266
childhood trauma cases are claims that a defense attorney was ineffective
because of a failure to present mitigation evidence or to present it sufficiently.
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that an attorney’s performance is
determined by a standard of “prevailing professional norms,”136 which, for
capital cases, entails a “thorough investigation”137 of “all reasonably available
mitigating evidence”138 relevant to a defendant’s history and circumstances.139
The Court has stressed repeatedly that a key part of this mitigation inquiry
requires attorneys to investigate defendants’ cognitive and intellectual
deficiencies because such evidence has a particularly pronounced impact on
mitigation, especially in death penalty cases.140
134. Id. at 800.
135. Id.
136. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
137. Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39 (2009) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
396 (2000)).
138. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (emphasis omitted) (quoting AM. BAR ASS’N,
ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY
CASES 11.4.1(C) (1989)).
139. Porter, 558 U.S. at 39.
140. These deficiencies cover a broad span. See Sears v. Upton, 561 U.S. 945, 946 (2010)
(frontal lobe damage); Porter, 558 U.S. at 36 (brain damage and cognitive defects in reading, writing,
and memory); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 392 (2005) (organic brain damage and significant
cognitive impairments); Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287 (2004) (impaired intellectual
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According to the Court, an attorney’s failure to conduct such an
investigation hinders the attorney’s ability to make reasonable strategic
decisions about how and when to present evidence that may benefit their
client.141 Furthermore, those attorneys open themselves up to defendants’
appeals claiming prejudicially deficient counsel in violation of the Sixth
Amendment, known as an “ineffective assistance of counsel” (IAC) or
Strickland claim.142
In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court established a two-pronged test to assess
the validity of ineffective assistance of counsel challenges in Strickland v.
Washington.143 First, counsel’s performance must actually be “deficient,” and
second, this deficient performance must have “prejudiced” the defendant.144 To
be “prejudiced,” counsel must not only be of poor quality but must also be the
“but for” cause of the resulting conviction.145 The Neuroscience Study revealed
that defendant-petitioners who met the Strickland standard were often provided
relief in three primary ways: a new penalty phase, a new trial (based on a
reversal of their conviction), or a new evidentiary hearing (based on a
remand).146
functioning); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535 (diminished mental capacities); Williams, 529 U.S. at 396
(borderline mental retardation). The American Bar Association Guidelines also advise attorneys to
conduct an investigation into a defendant’s neurological history as part of a death penalty defendant’s
mitigation claim. Specifically, the comment to Guideline 4.1 states: “Counsel must compile extensive
historical data, as well as obtain a thorough physical and neurological examination. Diagnostic studies,
neuropsychological testing, appropriate brain scans, blood tests or genetic studies, and consultation
with additional mental health specialists may also be necessary.” Am. Bar Ass’n, ABA Guidelines for
the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV.
913, 956 (2003). Indeed, scholars have suggested that the ABA’s guidelines provide more protection
for defendants than the Strickland test. See Ellen G. Koenig, A Fair Trial: When the Constitution
Requires Attorneys to Investigate Their Clients’ Brains, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 177, 204 (2013)
(“[U]nder the ABA Guidelines approach, neuroscience evidence should be a real part of counsel’s
reasonable investigation, and, specifically in capital cases, defense counsel may be ineffective for
failing to comply with this duty.”).
141. See Sears, 561 U.S. at 954 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 396) (“We rejected any suggestion
that a decision to focus on one potentially reasonable trial strategy . . . [can be] ‘justified by a tactical
decision’ when ‘counsel did not fulfill their obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the
defendant’s background.’”).
142. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–92 (1984) (establishing and discussing
the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel).
143. Id. at 687.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 694.
146. Denno, The Myth, supra note 5, at 506–07.
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As commentators have long noted, however, the Strickland standard “is
notoriously difficult for defendants to meet,” and the percentage of successful
claims is small.147 Overwhelmingly, courts presume that attorneys are
adequate, and even if defendants can surmount this presumption with a show
of an attorney’s deficiency, defendants can still fall short of meeting the
prejudice prong.148
Yet Strickland claims are particularly significant when neuroscientific
evidence is at issue, given the U.S. Supreme Court’s emphasis on the mitigating
value of neuroscientific evidence in criminal cases. Indeed, earlier analyses of
the Neuroscience Study demonstrated that nearly all of the successful
Strickland claims derived from an attorney’s failure to properly investigate,
collect, or comprehend neuroscientific evidence.”149
The 266 childhood trauma cases that this Article discusses were based on
the Neuroscience Study’s Defendant Cases and, therefore, already have a more
heightened likelihood than is typical of being ineffectively represented. In
addition, research on childhood trauma reveals the extent of the effect of all
sorts of trauma on brain functioning, either directly or indirectly. The following
Sections discuss the Neuroscience Study’s findings concerning how attorneys
present childhood trauma evidence in court, the strengths and weaknesses of
their arguments, and how courts respond to such arguments and evidence.
C. How Attorneys Present Childhood Trauma Evidence
In the great majority of the Neuroscience Study’s 266 cases (92.48%),
childhood trauma evidence was used by the defense for mitigation purposes in
a death penalty case, as Chart 13 indicates. In nearly two-thirds of the cases
(161 cases or 60.53%), the evidence was also introduced to suggest that an
attorney was ineffective for not presenting it. The other reasons for introducing
the evidence were far less common—to show that the defendant suffered from
a cognitive deficiency (what the courts still label as “mental retardation”), that

147. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1069, 1074
(2009); Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1 (2004).
148. See Hessick, supra note 147, at 1074 (discussing Strickland claims generally and observing
historical criticisms of the prejudice prong as overly difficult to satisfy); see also Nancy J. King,
Enforcing Effective Assistance After Martinez, 122 YALE L.J. 2428, 2431 (2013) (noting that prior to
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), “less than 1% of
noncapital habeas petitions were granted for any claim” and that Martinez will be unlikely to alter this
outcome).
149. Denno, The Myth, supra note 5, at 507.
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the evidence was related to a request for funding, or, for thirty-three cases, that
the evidence was admitted to support a defense.
CHART 13
Presentation of Evidence
266 Total Cases
Related to Sufficiency of the
Evidence Claim
Related to Claim of Prosecutorial
Misconduct

1
4

Related to Funding Request

8

Related to Claim of Mental
Retardation

12

Related to Claim of Court Error

15

In Support of Defense

33

Related to Ineffective Assistance
of Counsel Claim

161

Presented as Mitigating Evidence
0
100
Number of Cases

246
200

300

Chart 14 examines in more detail these thirty-three cases in which
childhood trauma evidence was used to support a defense. Many cases (13
cases or 40%) suggest that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial, while
nearly one-third of the cases (10 cases or 30%) support an insanity defense.
The evidence is used less commonly still for associated arguments (such as
claims of diminished capacity or mental illness).
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CHART 14
Defenses Linked to Childhood Trauma
33 Cases of the 266 Total Cases
Guilty but Mentally Ill
Not Guilty by Reason of Mental
Defect

1
3

Diminished Capacity

7

Insanity

10

Incompetence
0
2
4
Number of Cases

13
6

8

10

12

14

Chart 15 focuses on how courts respond to the presentation of this evidence.
Notably, while Charts 13 and 15 show that childhood trauma evidence was part
of a defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim in close to two-thirds
of the cases (161 cases or 60.53%), Chart 15 further reveals the breakdown of
wins and losses. Strikingly, among those 161 cases, the defendant’s claim was
successful over one-third of the time (57 cases or 35.40%). My prior research
has shown that neuroscientific evidence generally is a bonus in claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, and cases involving childhood trauma
evidence are no different.
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CHART 15
Court Response
266 Total Cases
Found Issue of
Malingering
Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Claim Accepted
Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel Claim Rejected

5
57
103

Evidence Rejected

90

Evidence Accepted

246
0

100
Number of Cases

200

300

In addition, Chart 15 indicates the willingness of courts to accept childhood
trauma evidence. While some or all of the childhood trauma evidence was
rejected by the court in one-third of the cases (90 cases or 33.83%), some or all
of such evidence was accepted by the court in the great majority of the cases
(246 cases or 92.48%). Therefore, courts were willing to accept at least some
of this evidence the great majority of the time.
D. How Attorneys Are Failing the Strickland Test
An attorney’s representation will often be found ineffective if they neglect
their duty to investigate a defendant’s background. In several cases in the
Neuroscience Study, the attorney did not attempt any meaningful investigation,
even though multiple instances of childhood trauma could have easily been
discovered.150
150. See, e.g., Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1162–64 (9th Cir. 2000) (vacating
defendant’s death sentence because counsel’s failure to present evidence of defendant’s physical abuse
from both parents, defendant’s father’s absence during his upbringing, and defendant’s diagnosis of
schizophrenia, could have impacted the outcome); Loyd v. Whitley, 977 F.2d 149, 154–57, 161 (5th
Cir. 1992) (granting the requested writ of habeas corpus after determining that counsel failed to develop
and present evidence of the defendant’s pre-natal issues, history of abuse and head injuries, and
childhood behavioral problems); Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 1009–11, 1013 (Fla. 2009) (vacating
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Attorneys can also be rendered deficient for failing to work with
defendants, lay witnesses, or experts to fully develop and present evidence. For
example, in Commonwealth v. Keaton, the attorney’s performance was found
deficient because he neglected to question family members about the
defendant’s childhood and did not adequately prepare them for their testimony
at trial.151
In addition, an attorney’s failure to understand the long-term effects of
childhood trauma and its impact on future behavior can have a detrimental
influence on the defendant’s case, especially if the attorney neglects to draw
connections between past trauma and the crimes committed. For example, in
Poindexter v. Mitchell, the court determined that had the defense attorney
conducted a thorough investigation, he would have found that the defendant’s
troubled upbringing and resulting psychological issues were a direct cause of
the behavior that resulted in the defendant’s triple murder.152 Lastly, poor
investigation or a misunderstanding of the importance of the evidence can
prompt an attorney to utilize a misguided strategy at trial or present the evidence
in a way that hinders the defendant’s case or results in a harsher sentence than
the defendant deserves.153
There are many challenges attorneys face when dealing with evidence of
childhood trauma, however, that may impede their ability to render effective
assistance. If a defendant has committed multiple crimes in the same case or
has committed the same type of crime several times in the past, a harsh sentence
will likely be unavoidable if the court views the sentence as a way to prevent
defendant’s death sentence because of counsel’s failure to investigate and present evidence of the
defendant’s poor childhood development, low IQ, intellectual deficiencies, and fetal alcohol
syndrome); see also infra note 216 and accompanying text.
151. See 45 A.3d 1050, 1083 (Pa. 2012).
152. See 454 F.3d 564, 580 (6th Cir. 2006).
153. See, e.g., Sinisterra v. United States, 600 F.3d 900, 905 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating that even
though counsel was aware of the defendant’s childhood head injuries and a neuropsychologist’s report
stating that the defendant “likely suffered brain damage,” counsel chose to follow a pre-trial
psychiatrist’s determination that defendant had “no mental problems” and, therefore, decided not to
introduce any evidence of childhood trauma); Correll v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 944, 956 (9th Cir. 2008)
(reversing the denial of the requested writ of habeas corpus after determining that, although defense
counsel was aware that potential mitigating evidence existed, including defendant’s troubled
childhood, counsel did not explore any avenues that might lead to development of that evidence); Smith
v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 939 (10th Cir. 2004) (granting the defendant’s petition for writ of habeas
corpus due to defense counsel’s failure to understand “that Mr. Smith's ‘borderline mental retardation,
mental illness, and organic brain impairment’ constituted mitigating evidence to be presented at the
penalty stage of Mr. Smith's capital trial”).

DENNO_11FEB20 (DO NOT DELETE)

344

2/11/2020 1:25 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[103:301

future criminal behavior. In some cases, the defendant’s crimes are just too
heinous to mitigate, at least in the eyes of those determining the sentence. For
example, in Pike v. State, despite the defendant’s history of birth defects, severe
child abuse, suicide attempts, and psychological issues, the court found that her
torturous and particularly heinous murder of a fellow college student was too
aggravating to be overcome.154
Sometimes attorneys face a situation where facts about a defendant’s
childhood trauma are too vague or remote to be considered by the court. If
witnesses are unavailable to provide detailed testimony of the trauma or the
trauma was minimal or occurred many years in the past, attorneys may find it
difficult to fully articulate the evidence to the court or connect it to the crime.
For example, in Stafford v. Saffle, the court determined that the defendant’s
weak evidence of childhood trauma was too vague and remote to be considered
relevant to the crimes committed when the defendant was age twenty-seven.155
In addition, defendants who are unable to remember certain childhood
events or have repressed traumatic events can be challenging to an attorney’s
representation. In some instances, defendants do not want their attorney to
investigate their background out of fear of potentially humiliating evidence
being presented at trial.156
Attorneys can also face difficulties when dealing with witnesses who
provide conflicting accounts of the defendant’s history or are unwilling to
cooperate. In one case, the defendant’s family only wanted to present evidence
that the defendant was from a good and loving family, even though the evidence
showed that as a child, the defendant suffered from learning disabilities,
substance abuse and neurological problems, poverty, and had a father in prison
for homicide.157
Lastly, a defense attorney’s case can be threatened by strong or convincing
arguments presented by the prosecution. If certain mitigating evidence has a
double-edged sword nature,158 the prosecution can use it to support their case
in aggravation or to open the door to other aggravating evidence.159 These
circumstances occur infrequently, but attorneys must be aware of them.
154. See Pike v. State, No. E2009-00016-CCA-R3-PD, 2011 WL 1544207, at *1 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Apr. 25, 2011).
155. See Stafford v. Saffle, 34 F.3d 1557, 1565 (10th Cir. 1994).
156. See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 475, 507, 509 (Fla. 2012).
157. Id. at 504–09.
158. For a discussion of the meaning, strength, and significance of “double-edged sword”
arguments, see Denno, The Myth, supra note 5, at 596–97.
159. See, e.g., Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 681 F.3d 1241, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 2012).
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E. Reasons for Successful Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
In an effort to more closely examine the fifty-seven childhood trauma cases
involving successful claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, it was helpful
to divide these cases into smaller groups based on their court responses. When
analyzing this group, I looked at the reasons the claims were successful, the
trial attorney’s defense or reasoning regarding why their performance was
deficient, as well as several other important aspects of these claims.
As Chart 16 shows, all but one of the fifty-seven cases were based on an
attorney’s failure to present mitigating evidence. Additional reasons pertained
primarily to counsel’s neglect in handling experts properly, either not
presenting a defense expert at all or not obtaining necessary neurological or
psychological testing. Likewise, some counsel neglected to call additional
witnesses to testify or failed to consult with and prepare an expert properly.
Clearly, courts expect attorneys to have a certain standard of expertise and
preparation when introducing childhood trauma evidence.
CHART 16
Reasons for Successful IAC Claim
57 of the 266 Total Cases
Counsel Improperly Relied on
Residual Doubt Theory

5

Counsel Failed to Consult with or
Prepare Expert
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Counsel Failed to Present Mitigating
Evidence
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Chart 17 lists the various defenses or reasoning counsel provided to explain
why the allegedly deficient performance occurred. In the majority of cases (40
cases or 70.17%), counsel explained that neglecting to introduce evidence or
handling experts in the way that they reported was a “reasonable trial strategy”
under Strickland and therefore acceptable in their eyes. “Reasonable trial
strategy” can often be a successful defense in cases where the court determines
the attorney was not deficient, since courts are prone to give great deference to
an attorney’s strategic choices.160 Seemingly, then, in the Chart 17 cases, the
court viewed the attorney’s conduct as particularly egregious. Other errors
pertained to the mishandling of evidence or ignorance about it, incompetence,
inexperience, or ignorance about the law, and, in a lesser number of cases,
episodes where the client hindered the investigation.
CHART 17
Counsel's Reasons for Deficiencies
57 of the 266 Total Cases
Other
Inability to Investigate
Client Limited Investigation
Incompetence, Inexperience or
Ignorance of the Law
Error Caused by Mishandling or
Ignorance of Evidence
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Chart 18 details more specifically how attorneys damaged their cases. For
most cases (52 cases or 91.23%), counsel failed to investigate the multiple types
of trauma that a defendant had experienced. In a majority of cases (40 cases or
70%), counsel “actively” damaged their cases in the sense that they chose not
160. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690–91 (1984).
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to pursue an investigation or claimed that not presenting evidence was a
“strategic decision.” In turn, in nearly the same number of cases (39 cases or
68%), counsel did not present any evidence of childhood trauma. Likewise, in
other cases (24 cases or 42.10%), counsel “passively” damaged their cases in
the sense that counsel was not aware that certain evidence existed or did not
actively choose to disregard a defendant’s background evidence. In the
remaining circumstances in Chart 18, counsel simply did not perform an
adequate job of presenting or preparing the evidence that they did decide to
submit on their client’s behalf.
CHART 18
How Attorneys Damage Their Cases
57 of the 266 Total Cases
Counsel Failed to Elaborate on
Evidence Already Presented
Counsel Insufficiently Presented
Evidence
Counsel Did Not Present Any
Childhood Trauma Evidence

9
18
39
24

Counsel Passively Damaged Case
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Counsel Actively Damaged Case
Counsel Failed to Present Multiple
Types of Trauma
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V. CASE STUDIES OF EFFECTIVE AND INEFFECTIVE USES OF CHILDHOOD
TRAUMA EVIDENCE
The Neuroscience Study provides empirical results indicating how courts
assess attorney performance as well as the varying approaches that attorneys
take toward childhood trauma evidence. The data suggests that such evidence
is not as impactful in the courtroom as might be expected given the existence
of extensive medical and psychological research on the lasting effects of
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childhood trauma. This Part presents individual case studies to further
contextualize these findings, emphasizing in particular the complexity of the
cases’ procedural histories and the long-term multi-traumatic nature of
defendants’ backgrounds.
A. Case Studies of Successful Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
There are innumerable factors that affect whether a court will conclude that
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel and, if so, change a
defendant’s original sentence. While Section B examines a range of
unsuccessful cases hindered by the strict requirements of both of Strickland’s
prongs, this Part briefly discusses six case studies of successful claims. The
focus is on the kinds of connections attorneys have created to make a difference
in terms of a defendant’s final sentence.
1. Steven James
Steven James and a co-defendant were tried in separate cases for the murder
of a man in Arizona in 1981.161 James was found guilty and sentenced to
death.162 The court determined that defense counsel was ineffective for failing
to conduct even the most basic investigation into James’s childhood, drug
history, and mental illness,163 noting that there were “obvious indications that
James had suffered emotional and psychological trauma during his
childhood.”164 James’s attorney possessed hard evidence of James’s mental
illness and disturbed childhood, and one expert alerted the attorney to scars on
James’s wrists from James’s past suicide attempts.165
Despite this evidence, the defense attorney did not investigate James’s past
and was therefore unfamiliar with the large amount of mitigating information
that could have been presented.166 The court stated that, “[t]he meager
mitigation evidence presented at sentencing bore no resemblance to the detailed
narrative of James’s life and mental health constructed by habeas counsel,”167
and found it reasonably probable that, if presented with this powerful mitigating

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

James v. Ryan, 679 F.3d 780, 785 (9th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 786.
Id. at 815.
Id. at 808.
Id. at 808–10.
Id. at 810.
Id. at 815.
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evidence, a sentencing court would not have returned a death sentence.168 (The
end result was that the court reversed the lower court’s denial of James’s habeas
corpus petition.)169
2. Samuel Morgan
Samuel Morgan was convicted of the murder of two men, and the
kidnapping and rape of one woman, and was sentenced to death.170 At trial,
Morgan’s defense counsel did not present any mitigation evidence, despite
being aware of its existence.171 The trial court judge noted that imposing the
death penalty in this case was “very distasteful” but that he was obligated by
state law to sentence Morgan to death since no sufficient mitigation factors
were found.172
On appeal, Morgan argued that his defense counsel was ineffective for
failing to investigate and introduce evidence of the brain damage he
experienced after being afflicted with encephalitis at twenty months old, as well
as a history of being abused as a child.173 Morgan presented the testimony of
two experts who stated that there was a definite link between Morgan’s brain
damage and his criminal conduct.174 The court determined that Morgan’s
defense counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of this link and
therefore vacated Morgan’s death sentence, noting in particular the trial judge’s
statement that the death penalty was solely imposed due to the lack of
mitigating evidence.175
3. Wydell Evans
Shortly after being released from prison, Wydell Evans shot and killed his
brother’s girlfriend during an argument stemming from her alleged
unfaithfulness to Evans’s brother.176 Evans was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death.177 On appeal, Evans claimed his counsel failed to
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 820.
Id. at 821.
People v. Morgan, 719 N.E.2d 681, 686–87 (Ill. 1999).
Id. at 704.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 710–11.
Id. at 711.
Id. at 708, 712.
Evans v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 681 F.3d 1241, 1244 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1245.
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investigate his troubled background and brain damage.178 Evans had suffered
a closed-head injury at the age of three, had several developmental and learning
disabilities, and engaged in alcohol abuse and violent behavior as a teenager.179
The court determined that while some of this evidence, including Evans’s
teenage behavior, may have been a double-edged sword, evidence of Evans’s
brain damage and developmental problems would have been more helpful than
harmful if presented.180 The court concluded that Evans’s trial counsel was
ineffective since this missing evidence was undisputed by the prosecution and
would have painted a strikingly different picture of Evans to the jury.181 (The
court reversed the lower court’s denial of Evans’s habeas corpus petition.)182
4. Anthony Bean
In this case, the defendant, Anthony Bean, was convicted of the first-degree
murder, robbery, and burglary of two women, on separate occasions, in their
homes.183 He was sentenced to death.184 On appeal, Bean argued that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing phase of his trial.185
To support this claim, Bean introduced abundant new mental health evidence
showing that he was mentally disabled, suffered from PTSD caused by
childhood experiences, and had brain damage.186
The court noted that Bean’s penalty-phase defense was “disorganized and
cursory” and that counsel ignored for months two experts’ strong
recommendations for further neuropsychological testing.187 The court found
counsel ineffective, noting that: “The jury which committed Bean to death had
no knowledge of the indisputably sadistic treatment Bean received as a child,
including repeated beatings which left a permanent indentation in his head.”188
In addition, the court stressed that, “[a]long with numerous other potentially
mitigating factors, his developmental delays, including placement in classes for
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 1250.
Id. at 1248–49, 1255.
Id. at 1269.
Id. at 1270.
Id.
Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1074–76 (9th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1074–75.
Id. at 1078.
Id. at 1079.
Id. at 1078.
Id. at 1081.
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the ‘educable mentally retarded,’ were reported to the jury only in the vaguest
of terms.”189 (Thus, the court remanded the case and affirmed the lower court’s
grant of Bean’s habeas relief.)190
5. Eric Simmons
Eric Simmons was convicted of the kidnapping, sexual battery, and murder
of a woman who was found dead in a wooded area in Sorrento, Florida.191
Simmons claimed that his trial counsel never introduced evidence of his history
of being abused as a child, brain damage from loss of oxygen as a toddler, poor
intelligence, and substance abuse problems.192 School records revealed that
Simmons suffered learning disabilities and began using marijuana at age
nine.193 By high school, Simmons was drinking about a dozen beers a day and
this level of substance abuse continued into his adult years.194 Experts believed
that his criminal behavior as an adult resulted from the extensive brain damage
he suffered in his early childhood, which impaired his ability to learn and
function socially.195
At trial, Simmons’s attorney decided to humanize Simmons by presenting
only positive mitigation evidence.196 Jurors heard “almost nothing” about
Simmons’s troubled childhood.197 The court determined that this trial strategy
was ineffective and that counsel neglected to conduct a thorough investigation
of Simmons’s background.198 The court rejected counsel’s explanation that
Simmons requested that no embarrassing or negative evidence about him be
presented to the jury,199 stating that counsel should have advised Simmons of
the importance of presenting such evidence rather than accept his uninformed
request.200 (The court vacated Simmons’s death sentence.)201

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id.
Id. at 1081, 1087.
Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 475, 483 (Fla. 2012).
Id. at 504–05.
Id. at 505.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 507.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 508.
Id.
Id. at 503–04.
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6. Angela Johnson
Angela Johnson was convicted of five counts of capital murder after she
aided and abetted her boyfriend in the brutal murder of three adults and two
children who witnessed her boyfriend’s drug trafficking activities.202 In 2005,
Johnson received a death sentence which, at the time, made her the first woman
to be sentenced to death by a federal jury since the 1950s.203 On appeal,
Johnson claimed that her trial counsel neglected to present mitigation evidence
that would have explained her mental state during the crime.204
The court reviewed the evidence presented during the penalty phase and
noted that Johnson’s attorney did present evidence of Johnson’s dysfunctional
family, history of abuse, drug use, and mental impairments.205 However, the
court found that counsel failed to connect Johnson’s troubled history to her
conduct at the time of the offense206 and ignored defense experts’ reports of
such a connection.207 According to the court, “[t]his is not just a case of failure
to present additional mental health evidence that was merely cumulative, or a
case in which counsel reasonably declined to provide further documentation to
support and explain trial experts’ opinions.”208 Rather, the court considered it
evidence “of substantial failure to present a viable mental health mitigation case
that was different in scope, content and connection to the offenses.”209 (The
court vacated Johnson’s death sentence.)210
B. The Two Prongs of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: A Closer Look
I have noted elsewhere that the Neuroscience Study’s data set of cases
contained an unusually high number of successful ineffective assistance of
counsel claims regarding the omission or misuse of neuroscientific evidence.211
Childhood trauma cases reflect a similar trend. To review, in total, there was
202. Johnson v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 2d 663, 663 (N.D. Iowa 2012).
203. Trish Mehaffey, Prosecutors Give Up Pursuit of Death Penalty for Angela Johnson, THE
GAZETTE (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.thegazette.com/subject/news/prosecutors-give-up-pursuit-ofdeath-penalty-for-angela-johnson-20141217 [https://perma.cc/9GBM-FMJB].
204. Johnson, 860 F. Supp. 2d at 881.
205. Id. at 887.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 891.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 920.
211. See Denno, The Myth, supra note 5, at 508.
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an ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding childhood trauma evidence
in 161 (60.53%) of the 266 cases. In about one-third of those cases (57 cases,
35.40%), the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was
successful. This Section examines more precisely the different prongs of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim and provides examples of its use and
effect in the context of childhood trauma evidence.
1. Strickland Prongs 1 and 2
Courts evaluate cases based upon the two-prong Strickland test. 212 First,
defendants must show that their trial counsel’s performance falls short of an
objective standard of reasonableness.213 Second, defendants must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced their defense such that the resulting sentence
was unreliable.214
The Neuroscience Study found a substantial number of instances where
both prongs of the Strickland standard were satisfied by counsel’s lack of
introduction of, or investigation into, childhood trauma evidence during the
penalty phase of trial. This outcome was especially prevalent in cases where
the attorney did little or nothing to uncover evidence that, during childhood,
defendants experienced significant physical and emotional abuse by parents or
guardians.215 Courts tend to deem such mitigating evidence necessary to
provide the sentencing judge with a more complete picture of the defendant’s
life.
For example, in Jackson v. Calderon, the trial court was never provided
evidence that the defendant was repeatedly beaten by both parents during
childhood, that the defendant’s father was absent during much his life growing
up, and that the defendant once was diagnosed with schizophrenia.216 The
Ninth Circuit noted that the trial court “would have been presented with a
different medical picture of Jackson’s state of consciousness than the one [it]

212. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
213. Id. at 687–88.
214. Id. at 687.
215. See, e.g., Cooper v. State, 739 So. 2d 82, 84–86 (Fla. 1999) (vacating the death penalty
sentence when trial counsel failed to present evidence of severe childhood abuse inflicted by the
defendant’s father—including head trauma, whipping with a gun, and verbal threats); see also Correll
v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938, 952–56 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that evidence of childhood abuse, substance
abuse during childhood, and time spent in state institutions are weighty mitigating circumstances
during the penalty phase of trial).
216. Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1162–64 (9th Cir. 2000).
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received, which was no picture at all.”217 Likewise, in Sinisterra v. United
States,218 the court concluded that a remand was required in order to determine
whether counsel was ineffective based on counsel’s omission and apparent
unawareness of a wide range of factors that could have had a bearing on the
defendant’s life trajectory: defendant’s parents were illiterate and violent, his
father abandoned the family, four teenagers gang-raped him and his brother
sexually abused him, he never learned to read or write, and he experienced two
head injuries.219 Counsel also ignored the assessment of a neuropsychologist
who concluded that the defendant “had a low range of intellectual abilities” and
“likely suffered brain damage and was at risk for poor judgment and
impulsivity,” choosing instead to follow a pre-trial psychiatrist’s determination
that defendant had “no mental problems.”220
Of course, childhood mitigation evidence will not always influence the
sentencing judge or jury.221 The degree to which courts consider evidence of
childhood trauma to be mitigating varies significantly from case to case. At the
same time, the extent to which attorneys can connect childhood trauma
evidence to their clients’ crimes appears to affect the likelihood that courts may
find both prongs of Strickland to be satisfied. While childhood trauma
mitigation evidence can provide a compelling narrative which could sway a
sentencing judge or jury, trial counsel can also follow numerous paths that do
not meet the Strickland standard.222
217. Id. at 1164; see also Perkins v. Hall, 708 S.E.2d 335, 342–44 (Ga. 2011) (vacating
defendant’s death sentence because of counsel’s failure to present evidence of defendant’s rape by a
neighbor at age eight as well as physical abuse from defendant’s father, including giving defendant
bottles of Jack Daniels and marijuana at age thirteen and urinating on him; the court concluded that
there was a reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different outcome in the
sentencing phase).
218. 600 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2010).
219. Id. at 905, 912.
220. Id. at 905.
221. A judge or a jury may decide, for example, that aggravating factors far outweigh nonstatutory mitigating factors like an abusive childhood. See Baker v. State, 71 So. 3d 802, 812, 823
(Fla. 2011) (upholding the trial court’s determination that, despite expert testimony that defendant’s
parents were neglectful and physically abusive towards him and that his mother used drugs and alcohol
during pregnancy, such evidence was insufficient to vacate the death penalty sentence); see also
McLaughlin v. State, 378 S.W.3d 328, 352–53 (Mo. 2012) (holding that there was no basis to think
that additional evidence of defendant’s troubled and abusive childhood would have made a difference
at trial).
222. See, e.g., In re Visciotti, 926 P.2d 987, 1001 (Cal. 1996) (noting that, while trial counsel
was put on notice of possible family discord, presentation of a “family sympathy” defense was
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2. Strickland Prong 1 Cases: Performance
As would be expected, the Neuroscience Study generally found that the first
prong of Strickland is not satisfied if the court determines that the attorney’s
investigation into the defendant’s background is sufficient. For example, in
Fleenor v. Farley, the court was satisfied that “[t]he trial lawyers interviewed
several family members and presented testimony tending to show a troubled
childhood in terms of physical abuse.”223 Similarly, in Commonwealth v.
Lesko, the court held that trial counsel’s investigation was reasonable and
extensive presentation of social history was sufficient; the court emphasized
that the jury was aware of the defendant’s childhood trauma due to the
testimony of a forensic social worker and found it to be mitigating, but still
voted for death.224
Courts have determined that the first prong of Strickland is not satisfied in
cases where the defendant made it difficult for counsel to obtain mitigating
information or insisted that certain information not be presented. In Davis v.
Greer, the court found that although counsel wanted to present testimony of
Davis’s mental illness starting in childhood and a head injury that resulted in
brain damage, after being informed of his options, Davis chose not to have the
evidence provided to the jury.225 The question of whether the defendant made
an informed decision appears to be pivotal.
The first prong of Strickland is not satisfied when the court holds that
counsel made a strategic decision not to present mitigating evidence of
childhood trauma. The court in Edwards v. Ayers disagreed with Edwards that
counsel was ineffective in failing to introduce evidence that Edwards began
suffering from mental illness in childhood: “counsel’s investigation
discover[ed] little that is helpful and much that is harmful” and therefore
“reasonably decide[d] to forego presenting evidence of the defendant’s
background.”226 Similarly, in Smith v. Workman, the court held that counsel
“was understandably reluctant to . . . open the door to Petitioner’s lifetime
propensity for fighting,” also noting that “the question is not whether [counsel]
could have done more, but rather whether [counsel’s] decision not to do more
preferable over mitigating evidence); see also Turner v. State, 953 So. 2d 1063, 1075 (Miss. 2007)
(finding that trial counsel’s decision not to present good character evidence, in order to avoid risking
cross-examination about bad character proof, was justified).
223. 47 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1043 (S.D. Ind. 1998).
224. 15 A.3d 345, 381 (Pa. 2011).
225. 13 F.3d 1134, 1139 (7th Cir. 1994).
226. 542 F.3d 759, 772 (9th Cir. 2008).
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was objectively reasonable, applying heavy deference to the counsel’s
judgments.”227
The first prong of Strickland is normally satisfied, however, if counsel
failed to investigate the defendant’s background or if the investigation was so
minimal that any mitigating evidence that was discovered and presented is
inadequate compared to what a reasonable investigation would have
revealed.228 In Morales v. Mitchell, the court agreed with Morales that evidence
of childhood trauma, which was not presented by counsel, was “significant and
not cumulative.”229 This evidence included alcohol consumption starting at an
early age, a “mentally retarded” brother, the suicide of his sister, abuse by his
brother, lack of supervision by his parents, and pressure from his community to
drink alcohol.230 According to the court in Hamblin v. Mitchell, the fact that
“counsel does not know what an investigation will reveal is no reason not to
conduct the investigation.”231 Thus, the court held that “[c]ounsel was obligated
227. 550 F.3d 1258, 1271 (10th Cir. 2008). In Miller v. State, Miller argued that trial counsel
did not present his psychological history which incorporated information about child abuse. This abuse
included “Miller witnessing his cousins raping his sisters and his father beating him for reporting what
he had witnessed, as well as his emotional deprivation from his father's alcoholism and his mother's
withdrawal.” 926 So. 2d 1243, 1251 (Fla. 2006). The court found counsel’s decisions to be reasonable.
Id. In articulating its decision, the court stated:
Trial counsel testified that he chose not to present certain mental health records
because he believed they contained detrimental information. . . . Moreover, the
records contain a report that tends to refute Miller's claim that he was remorseful
after his first murder, and they indicate that Miller's recounting of his childhood
and possible sexual abuse was inconsistent. Trial counsel was concerned that the
introduction of these records would have opened the door to damaging crossexamination and possible rebuttal witnesses. Finally, trial counsel was confident
that by presenting family members, he was able to present mitigating evidence
regarding Miller's dysfunctional family, including physical abuse, and also to
present testimony regarding the deaths of close family members.
Id.; see also Montez v. Czerniak, 239 P.3d 1023, 1032–33 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that defense
counsel’s decision not to pursue evidence of sexual abuse and brain injury was reasonable in light of
the fact that defendant failed to disclose a history of sexual abuse and a neurological screening revealed
no signs of brain injury).
228. Similarly, in Laird v. Horn, Laird argued that potentially mitigating circumstances were not
discovered. 159 F. Supp. 2d 58, 109 (E.D. Pa. 2001). These included “his traumatic childhood” and
“severe childhood physical and sexual abuse.” Id. The court agreed with Laird, holding, “[t]here is
no evidence that trial counsel conducted any inquiry into petitioner's background and medical history
in connection with the penalty phase.” Id. at 115.
229. 507 F.3d 916, 933 (6th Cir. 2007).
230. Id. at 932–33.
231. 354 F.3d 482, 492 (6th Cir. 2003).
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to find out the facts, not to guess or assume or suppose some facts may be
adverse.”232
Counsel in Williams v. Taylor did not request juvenile and social services
records because they mistakenly believed such information was not allowed by
state law.233 The Court held, however, that “[w]hether or not those omissions
were sufficiently prejudicial to have affected the outcome of sentencing, they
clearly demonstrate that trial counsel did not fulfill their obligation to conduct
a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.”234
3. Strickland Prong 2 Cases: Prejudice
If counsel’s performance was found to be ineffective, the court then
considers whether this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. If the
court does not believe that the introduction of childhood trauma evidence could
have resulted in a different outcome, then the defendant has not established
prejudice. For example, in Bible v. Ryan, the court concluded that any evidence
of childhood trauma was “speculative” and held that its confidence in the
outcome of the sentencing hearing was not undermined.235 In Samayoa v.
Ayers, counsel was found to be likely ineffective for not conducting a proper
inquiry into potentially mitigating evidence, including the defendant’s
232. Id.
233. 529 U.S. 362, 373 (2000).
234. Id. at 396. The Court noted that if counsel had conducted an investigation,
the jury would have learned that Williams’ parents had been imprisoned for the
criminal neglect of Williams and his siblings, that Williams had been severely
and repeatedly beaten by his father, that he had been committed to the custody of
the social services bureau for two years during his parents’ incarceration
(including one stint in an abusive foster home), and then, after his parents were
released from prison, had been returned to his parents’ custody.
Id. at 395. The first prong of Strickland can also be satisfied even if the defendant resisted having
certain information presented although this circumstance is typically persuasive only when the
defendant was not informed of their options. In Stafford v. Saffle, for example, there was evidence
“that Stafford had been physically abused as a child, been locked in a closet by his father for days at a
time, shot his father in the stomach to stop him from beating his mother, spent time in juvenile facilities,
and had a tumor removed from his brain.” 34 F.3d 1557, 1563 (10th Cir. 1994). Although Stafford
insisted that his childhood evidence be withheld, the court determined that it was the attorney’s
“responsibility to advise Stafford that the mitigating evidence of his personal background was not
inconsistent with his claim that he did not commit the murders.” Id. Likewise, in Walker v. State, the
court held that “even if Walker was resistant to defense counsel's efforts, defense counsel's failure to
attempt to collect background records and testimony from available family members and friends
supports the conclusion that counsel’s performance was deficient.” 88 So. 3d 128, 141 (Fla. 2012).
235. 571 F.3d 860, 872 (9th Cir. 2009).
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numerous head injuries and physical, emotional, and sexual abuse in
childhood.236 However, given the brevity of jury deliberations, the court
doubted that the mitigation evidence might have convinced a juror to “[strike]
a different balance between life and death.”237
Similarly, in Sochor v. State, Sochor argued that counsel was ineffective for
failing to investigate and present mitigating background evidence, especially of
severe beatings by both parents.238 While the court determined that counsel’s
performance was deficient, it still held that “Sochor failed to show a reasonable
probability that absent counsel’s errors, he would not have been sentenced to
death.”239 Furthermore, “even if defense counsel had adequately investigated
Sochor’s background and prepared for the penalty phase, he would not have
been able to present at the penalty phase any evidence significantly different
from the evidence actually presented.”240 As the court concluded, “Sochor has
not demonstrated that but for counsel’s deficient performance the result of the
penalty phase would have been different.”241
The second prong of Strickland is also not satisfied when the court states
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances,
including evidence of childhood trauma.242 In People v. Ray, for example, Ray
presented evidence of childhood trauma during the penalty phase of trial.243
Ray’s parents were both alcoholics and fought often.244 While Ray’s father was
absent from his life, Ray’s mother worked as a prostitute, brought customers
into the room where she and her children slept, and had Ray steal money from

236. 649 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1132–33 (S.D. Cal. 2009).
237. Id. at 1135.
238. 883 So. 2d 766, 771 (Fla. 2004).
239. Id. at 774.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 784; see also Wiles v. Bagley, 561 F.3d 636, 639 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that the
defendant did not show that there was a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s deficient
performance, the result of his mitigation hearing would have been different).
242. See, e.g., In re Visciotti, 926 P.2d 987, 1005 (Cal. 1996) (concluding that it was not probable
that, in the eyes of the jury, evidence of Visciotti’s troubled family background would have outweighed
the aggravating evidence presented by the state); see also Turner v. State, 953 So. 2d 1063, 1076–77
(Miss. 2007) (finding that the aggravating factors involved, including the brutal and gruesome nature
of the crime, outweighed the mitigating evidence of the defendant’s dysfunctional childhood and
mental illness and warranted a death sentence).
243. 914 P.2d 846, 854–55 (Cal. 1996).
244. Id. at 855.
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her customers.245 His mother also physically abused him.246 A psychiatrist
determined that Ray suffered from “fetal alcohol syndrome” and “severe
parental deprivation, including likely sexual abuse.”247 Nevertheless, the court
affirmed the judgment of the trial court that “any sympathetic inferences that
could be drawn from evidence of defendant’s troubled childhood, mental
defects, and religious conversion were far ‘outweighed’ by the calculated nature
of the capital crimes and by his extensive criminal history.”248
The second prong of Strickland is satisfied, however, if the court feels that
the potentially mitigating evidence could have resulted in a different outcome.
In James v. Ryan, evidence of childhood trauma was presented by James’s
federal habeas counsel.249 James’s biological father was a drug addict, his
stepfather was physically abusive, and his biological parents were neglectful
and exposed him to dangerous conditions, including extensive time with a child
molester.250 The court noted that the mitigation evidence presented at
sentencing did not scratch the surface of what was available and concluded
“that there is a reasonable probability that a sentencing court confronted with
the powerful mitigating evidence developed by James’s habeas counsel would
not have returned a death sentence.”251

245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 856.
248. Id. at 875. In San Martin v. State, San Martin claimed counsel was ineffective for not
conducting a proper investigation into his background. 995 So. 2d 247, 255 (Fla. 2008). San Martin
pointed to potentially mitigating evidence that his father was a physically abusive alcoholic. Id. at
255–56. The court held that, “[g]iven the abundance of aggravation in this case, we find no prejudice.
Even assuming counsel was deficient in failing to present the additional mitigation evidence, our
confidence in the outcome is not undermined. The additional mitigating evidence would be insufficient
to outweigh the significant aggravation.” Id. at 259. Similarly, in Stafford v. Saffle, although counsel’s
performance was deficient, the court held that Stafford failed to establish prejudice. 34 F.3d 1557,
1565 (10th Cir. 1994). Finally, in State v. Henretta, the court held that, “[i]n mitigation of
the . . . aggravating circumstances, Mr. Henretta presented evidence that he was abused and neglected
during his childhood [and] that he has brain damage. . . . The evidence supports the jury’s finding that
the aggravating circumstances outweighed these mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.”
325 S.W.3d 112, 146 (Tenn. 2010).
249. 679 F.3d 780, 801 (9th Cir. 2012).
250. Id. at 810–13.
251. Id. at 820; see also Libberton v. Ryan, 583 F.3d 1147, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2009); Hamblin
v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482, 490–91 (6th Cir. 2003); Walker v. State, 88 So.3d 128, 140–41 (Fla. 2012);
People v. Ruiz, 686 N.E.2d 574, 582–83 (Ill. 1997).
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C. Courts’ Overall Characterization of Childhood Trauma
In this particular group of cases, there was not a clear indication that any
one type of childhood trauma was more persuasive to a court. However, in
cases where the trauma was viewed as isolated in time, the court was less likely
to find it a persuasive mitigating factor. For example, in Miller v. State, Miller
claimed he was abused as a child by his father.252 The trial court gave “no
weight” to the child abuse because Miller’s father died when Miller was
thirteen, and the Supreme Court of Florida found no error.253 Similarly, in
Stafford v. Saffle, the court characterized evidence of childhood trauma as
“conclusory and remote.”254 The court noted that “Stafford was 27 years old at
the time of this crime, and these childhood events were remote in time by
then. . . . Stafford presented no evidence that these events had any continuing
effect on his ability to conform his conduct to noncriminal behavior.”255
VI. WHAT SHOULD ATTORNEYS DO IN CHILDHOOD TRAUMA CASES?
While courts often accept evidence of childhood trauma in mitigation
arguments, this outcome does not imply such evidence will successfully
mitigate or lessen a defendant’s sentence. In fact, in most cases in the
Neuroscience Study, the court, jury, or both found that this evidence was
outweighed by aggravating factors and affirmed the defendant’s sentence.
A. Drawing Connections
In general, if childhood trauma evidence is found to be vague, remote, or
irrelevant, courts are likely to reject it for the purposes of mitigating a sentence.
In Adanandus v. Johnson, for example, the defendant argued that his childhood
medical records describing head injuries should be included as mitigating
evidence.256 The court, however, was not convinced that the records were
relevant, since they did not establish that the defendant’s criminal conduct was
attributable to the injuries.257
In addition, courts often assume defendants have personal responsibility,
even if this assumption contradicts psychological and medical knowledge about
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

926 So. 2d 1243, 1251 (Fla. 2006).
Id. at 1258.
Stafford v. Saffle, 34 F.3d 1557, 1565 (10th Cir. 1994).
Id.
947 F. Supp. 1021, 1035 (W.D. Tex. 1996).
Id. at 1052.
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the consequences of child abuse.258 For example, in two cases discussed in
another study, Elledge v. Dugger and State v. Steffen, the courts discounted the
long term effects of physical abuse on the defendants when their siblings, who
experienced the same abuse, appeared to be unaffected.259
That said, defense attorneys should be fulfilling their constitutional duty to
thoroughly investigate the defendant’s background and family history. Since
the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that this information is relevant
mitigating evidence during capital proceedings, there is no excuse for an
attorney to shun it.
Defense attorneys also need to effectively communicate with their clients
about the importance of providing such evidence. As mentioned previously,
some defendants are wary of presenting evidence about their past out of fear of
embarrassment. In these situations, attorneys need to stress that revealing
information about the defendant’s history may lessen their sentence, a reality
that can possibly outweigh a defendant’s fears.
Attorneys and judges should seek education regarding the effects of
childhood trauma and how such trauma can impact adult behavior and
cognition. This knowledge should also be conveyed to juries to allow them to
make informed decisions when it comes to convictions and sentencing.
Not only should attorneys investigate and present this evidence, it is vital
that they draw connections between childhood trauma and the defendant’s
offenses and criminal behavior. If juries are made aware of such connections,
they will be able to better understand the defendant’s actions and decisionmaking processes.
B. An Exemplar Case of Drawing Connections
Blue v. Cockrell exemplifies a circumstance where the attorney did make a
connection between the defendant’s history of trauma and the offense
committed in his presentation of mitigating evidence.260 Michael Lynn Blue
was convicted of the robbery and murder of a cab driver in Texas and was
sentenced to death.261 Blue confessed to hitting the man’s head with a claw

258. Crocker, supra note 3, at 1182.
259. Id. at 1182 n.160 (first citing Elledge v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1439, 1447 (11th Cir. 1987); and
then citing State v. Steffen, 509 N.E.2d 383, 397 (Ohio 1987)).
260. See Blue v. Cockrell, 298 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 2002).
261. Id. at 319.
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hammer and taking his wallet.262 His accomplice shot the man in the head
twice, and the two then burglarized the man’s house.263
At trial, Blue’s attorney presented evidence of his childhood, including the
physical and sexual abuse he endured, his mental disability, and his antisocial
personality disorder.264 On appeal, Blue claimed that the instructions the jury
received prevented the jury from fully considering this mitigating evidence.265
In order to determine the validity of Blue’s claim and whether additional
instruction was needed, the Court had to decide if the evidence presented was
relevant to the offense committed.266
The court found that the severity of the mitigating evidence, as well as the
fact that Blue’s attorney showed a definite nexus between the evidence and the
criminal conduct, qualified the evidence as highly relevant.267 Thus, the court
concluded that an additional instruction was needed to allow the jury to fully
consider this nexus.268 Ultimately, the court affirmed the District Court’s grant
of relief on Blue’s federal habeas corpus petition.269
This Article has provided other examples in which attorneys successfully
connected childhood trauma evidence to the crimes their clients committed.
While this Article has also considered in detail the challenges that attorneys
face in their attempts to present and connect such evidence, the increasing
availability of research on this topic demonstrates the existence of strong and
convincing patterns if attorneys decide to avail themselves of childhood trauma
evidence and courts decide to accept it.
VII. CONCLUSION
The introduction of childhood trauma evidence is an important part of a
defense attorney’s representation of a criminal defendant. An attorney’s failure
to uphold their duty to investigate and present this evidence to a judge or jury
could have detrimental effects on the defendant’s case and could result in their
client receiving a death penalty or prolonged incarceration.

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 319–20.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 321.
Id.
Id. at 322.
Id.
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Childhood trauma evidence is most compelling when a nexus is shown
between the trauma and the criminal behavior. An attorney who understands
the long-term effects of childhood trauma will be better equipped to make such
connections.
The increasing sophistication of research indicating associations among
defendants’ childhood trauma and their later cognitive and behavioral problems
may not be sufficiently used or recognized in criminal court cases, by either
judges or attorneys. While capital cases allow for the introduction of a broad
array of mitigating evidence, the strength of some of that evidence may be
dampened by the standards for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
which are highly deferential to attorney discretion. Yet increasingly, attorneys’
“strategic decisions” and courts’ acceptance of them may reflect more of a
willful blind eye to scientific advances than a protection for the decisions that
attorneys make in criminal cases each day, wisely or not.

